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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs, 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
and AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
Cert No. 
Category No. 13 
Court of Appeals Case No, 
880331-CA 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions presented for review are 
important questions which appear to be of first impression 
concerning the limitations on negotiability and holder in due 
course status under the particular statutory provisions and 
should be settled by this court rather than the Court of Appeals, 
Furthermore, to allow the Court of Appeals' decision to stand 
would result in a gross miscarriage of justice because 
§70A-3-304(2) (Utah Code Ann. 1965), indisputably eliminates 
First Federal as a holder in due course as is discussed herein-
after. 
I. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly ignore the undis-
puted and critical fact that the Air Terminal note and its 
contemporaneous accompanying Purchase and Security Agreement 
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were assigned and delivered to First Federal together as a 
package pursuant to words of assignment prepared by First Federal, 
and then wrongly hold that the wording in the note that "reference 
is made to the Purchase and Security Agreement for additional 
rights of the holder hereof" did not impair negotiability under 
§70A-3"10^(1)(b) which states that to be negotiable an instrument 
must contain "no other promise, order, obligation or power 
given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this 
chapter; . . ."? 
II. Whether the Court of AppealsT decision reversing 
the trial courtTs judgment that the Air Terminal note was not 
negotiable and First Federal was not a holder in due course 
conflicts with this court's decision in Calfo v. P. C. Stewart 
Co., et al., 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986), 
concerning what constitutes notice to and knowledge of a potential 
infirmity to a holder such as First Federal, under the circum-
stances herein? 
III. Whether the Court of Appeals wrongly reversed 
the trial court (a) by holding that First Federal was a holder 
in due course because it had no notice of a claim or defense 
under §70A~3-30^(2) even though Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary, 
received $18,500 from the $100,000 loan First Federal made 
to Gump & Ayers because receipt of such amount by Gump & Ayers 
was not a "benefit" under the statute, and (b) by wholly failing 
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to consider another portion of §70A-3"~304 (2) under which First 
Federal was absolutely charged with notice of a claim when 
Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary, assigned the Air Terminal note and 
accompanying agreement to First Federal as security for Gump 
& AyersT own $100,000 debt? 
IV. Did the Court of Appeals misinterpret §70A-3-119(D 
and §70A-3-304(l) in holding that First Federal was a holder 
in due course even though First Federal received the Air Terminal 
note and agreement together and even though the agreement indicated 
that there were limitations and that Air Terminal's obligation 
was partly or wholly voidable? 
REFERENCE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION 
The Court of Appeals' opinion is reported in First 
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Gump & Ayers Real Estate, 
Inc. and Air Terminal Gifts, Inc., 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (April 
11, 1989)- A copy of the Court of Appeals' decision is included 
in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals' decision was entered on April 
4, 1989. There was no petition for rehearing filed, no request 
for an extension of time in which to file for rehearing, and 
no order entered in regard to a rehearing. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by §78-2-2(3)(a) and 
(5) (Utah Code Ann. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory provisions together with 
added underlining of the critical portions thereof are: 
1. §70A-3-10MD(b) (Utah Code Ann. 1965) Form of 
negotiable instruments . . . 
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument 
within this chapter must 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or 
order to pay a sum certain in money and no other 
promise, order, obligation or power given by the 
maker or drawer except as authorized by this chapter; 
~ ~. ~. (Emphasis added.) 
§70A-3"105 (Utah Code Ann. 1965). When promise or 
order unconditional. 
(1) A promise or order otherwise unconditional is 
not made conditional by the fact that the instrument 
(a) is subject to implied or constructive condi-
tions; or 
(b) states its consideration, whether performed 
or promised, or the transaction which gave rise to 
the instrument, or that the promise or order is made 
or the instrument matures in accordance with or "as 
per" such transaction; or 
(c) refers to or states that it arises out 
of a separate agreement or refers to a separate 
agreement for rights as to prepayment or acceleration; 
or 
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(d) states that it is drawn under a letter 
of credit; or 
(e) states that it is secured, whether bv 
mortgage, reservation of title or otherwise; or 
(f) indicates a particular account to be 
debited or any other fund or source from which 
reimbursement is expected; or 
Cg) is limited to payment out of a particular 
fund or the proceeds of a particular source, if the 
instrument is issued by a government or governmental 
agency or unit; or 
(h) is limited to payment out of the entire 
assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, 
trust or estate by or on behalf of which the instru-
ment is issued. 
(2) A promise or order is not unconditional if the 
instrument 
(a) states that it is subject to or governed 
by any other agreement; or 
(b) states that it is to be paid only out of 
a particular fund or source except as provided in 
this section. 
§70A-3~112 (Utah Code Ann. 1965). Terms and omissions 
not affecting negotiability. 
(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not 
affected by 
(a) the omission of a statement of any consid-
eration or of the place where the instrument is 
drawn or payable; or 
(b) a statement that collateral has been given 
to secure obligations either on the instrument or 
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otherwise of an obligor on the instrument or that 
in the case of default on those obligations the holder 
may realize on or dispose of the collateral; or 
(c) a promise or power to maintain or protect 
collateral or to give additional collateral; or 
(d) a term authorizing a confession of Judgment 
on the instrument if it is not paid when due; or 
(e) a term purporting to waive the benefit 
of any law intended for the advantage or protection 
of any obligor; or 
(f) a term in a draft providing that the payee 
by indorsing or cashing it acknowledges full 
satisfaction of an obligation of the drawer; or 
(g) a statement in a draft drawn in a set of 
parts (Section 70A-3-801) to the effect that the 
order is effective only if no other part has been 
honored. 
2. §70A-3-H9 (Utah Code Ann. 1965). Other writings 
affecting instrument. 
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee 
or any transferee the terms of an instrument may be 
modified or affected by any other written agreement 
executed as a part of the same transaction, except that 
a holder in due course is not affected by any limitation 
of his rights arising out of the separate written agreement 
if he had no notice of the limitation when he took the 
instrument. (Emphasis added.) 
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the 
negotiability of an instrument. 
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3. §70A-3-304(l)(b) and (2) (Utah Code Ann. 1965). 
Notice to purchaser. 
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense 
(b) the purchaser has notice that the 
obligation of any party is voidable in whole or 
in part, . . . 
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against 
the instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary 
has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as 
security for his own debt or in any transaction for 
his own benef it or otherwise in breach of duty. 
~ '. '. (Emphasis added. ) 
§70A-3-302(l)(c) (Utah Code Ann. 1965). Holder 
in due course. 
(1) A holder in due is a holder who takes the 
instrument 
(c) without notice . . . of any defense 
against or claim to it on the part of any 
person. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
First Federal sued Gump & Ayers on its $100,000 
promissory note payable to First Federal and sued Air Terminal 
on its $125,000 promissory note payable to the Sunayers limited 
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partnership of which Gump & Ayers was the general partner. 
When Gump & Ayers executed the $100,000 note, Gump & Ayers 
assigned the Air Terminal note and its companion Purchase and 
Security Agreement to First Federal as security for the Gump 
& Ayers1 note. The trial court granted summary Judgment to 
First Federal on the Gump & Ayersf note but denied summary 
Judgment on the Air Terminal note. 
After a trial of the issues between First Federal 
and Air Terminal, the trial court held that First Federal had 
received the Air Terminal agreement and note as companion 
parts of a single package transaction; that the Air Terminal 
note incorporated rights in the accompanying agreement and 
thus contained other powers which precluded negotiability; 
that First Federal knew that Gump & Ayers was a fiduciary and 
that First Federal had knowledge and notice of a limitation 
in the companion agreement and of a claim against the Air 
Terminal note under the applicable statutes. The trial court 
rendered judgment that the Air Terminal note was not negotiable 
and that First Federal was not a holder in due course because 
of actual knowledge and notice and was therefore subject to 
Air Terminal's defenses against Gump & Ayers and Sunayers. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
decision and held that the Air Terminal note was negotiable 
and that First Federal was a holder in due course. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are divided into numbered 
paragraphs to make reference thereto more convenient: 
1. Air Terminal agreed to invest $200,000 in the 
Sunayers Limited Partnership on June 5, 1984 by paying $75,000 
in cash and executing a thirteen (13) page Purchase and 
Security Agreement ("purchase agreement") together with a 
contemporaneous and integrated companion promissory note in 
the amount of $125,000. The Air Terminal purchase agreement 
specifically incorporates the note in paragraph 2 thereof and 
the note specifically refers to the purchase agreement "for 
additional rights of the holder hereof." Copies of the Air 
Terminal note and purchase agreement were introduced as Trial 
Exhibits 4 and 5, and are included in the Appendix. 
2. Under the Air Terminal purchase agreement Sunayers 
is given the rights to sell the security, to charge expenses, 
sell the partnership interest, declare a forfeiture, power 
of attorney, delivery of assets, execution of documents and 
all other "remedies under law." (Trial Exhibit 5.) 
3. The Air Terminal note (Trial Exhibit 4) contains 
the following statement on page 2 just above the signature 
line: 
Reference is made to the Purchase and Security 
Agreement for additional rights of the holder hereof. 
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4. The Air Terminal purchase agreement and note 
were parts of a contemporaneous, integrated, package transaction. 
(See T. 27"30; Conclusion of Law No. 2, R. 501.) 
5. After the Air Terminal purchase agreement and 
note were signed, Gump & Ayers, the general partner of Sunayers, 
borrowed $100,000 from First Federal, signed a promissory note 
(Gump & AyersT note) for that amount which note does not indicate 
the purpose of the loan, and assigned the Air Terminal note 
and purchase agreement to First Federal as security for the 
Gump & Ayers? note. (T. 8, 13.) 
6. The original Gump & Ayers1 note and subsequent 
renewal notes were prepared by First Federal (T. 15) and each 
refers to the Air Terminal note and purchase agreement by the 
following statement which is typed on the bottom of the Gump 
& Ayers1 note (Trial Exhibit 3): 
The indebtedness evidenced by this note is 
secured by a Promissory Note dated June 5, 1984 
and a Security Agreement of even date. 
A copy of the last renewal Gump & Ayers' note which was the 
note sued upon is included in the Appendix. 
7. First Federal was the author of the following 
statement of assignment by Gump & Ayers to First Federal typed 
on the bottom of the Air Terminal note at the time of assign-
ment (T. 14): 
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Sunayers hereby assigns, with recourse, all of its 
right, title and interest in the above promissory note 
and the agreement securing it to First Federal Savings 
and Loan Assn. of Salt Lake City. 
Sunayers Limited Partnership 
by Gump and Ayers 
Real Estate, Inc. 
Its General Partner 
8. The amount of First Federal's $100,000 loan to 
Gump & Ayers was based upon Gump & AyersT written list to First 
Federal showing that the loan was in part to pay Gump & Ayers 
$18,500 and to cover the Morse shortfall which Air Terminal 
was indemnified against by the purchase agreement. (Trial 
Exhibit A; T-39.) There was no evidence that the $18,500 was 
a "debt11 owed Gump & Ayers or was for any other specific purpose 
except that it was on the Gump & Ayers' list below the wording 
"ITEMS DUE TO MORSE SHORTFALL." (See T. 19-20.) A copy of 
Gump & AyersT list is included in the Appendix. 
9. The Court of Appeals1 opinion does not refer 
to the fact that the Air Terminal note and accompanying purchase 
agreement were assigned to First Federal as a package for 
security and does not discuss how such fact would affect the 
issues of negotiability and First Federal's claim that it was 
a holder in due course. (See Court of Appeals' opinion pp. 
28-31.) 
10. The Court of Appeals' opinion states that the 
$18,500 Gump & Ayers received from the $100,000 loan was a 
"debt due Gump & Ayers." (Court of Appeals' opinion p. 28.) 
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11. The Court of Appeals principally bases its holding 
that the Air Terminal note was negotiable on its conclusion 
that the Air Terminal note was unconditional. (See Court of 
Appeals' opinion p. 28.) 
12. The Court of Appeals' opinion concludes that 
First Federal is a holder in due course because although Gump 
& Ayers was a fiduciary, Gump & Ayers received no "benefit" 
from the First Federal loan and because Gump & Ayers did not breach 
its fiduciary duty in assigning the Air Terminal note to First 
Federal. (See Court of Appeals' opinion pp. 29~30.) 
ARGUMENT 
QUESTION I. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY IGNORE 
THE UNDISPUTED AND CRITICAL FACT THAT THE AIR TERMINAL 
NOTE AND ITS CONTEMPORANEOUS ACCOMPANYING PURCHASE AND 
SECURITY AGREEMENT WERE ASSIGNED AND DELIVERED TO FIRST 
FEDERAL TOGETHER AS A PACKAGE PURSUANT TO WORDS OF 
ASSIGNMENT PREPARED BY FIRST FEDERAL, AND THEN WRONGLY 
HOLD THAT THE WORDING IN THE NOTE THAT "REFERENCE IS 
MADE TO THE PURCHASE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL 
RIGHTS OF THE HOLDER HEREOF" DID NOT IMPAIR NEGOTIABILITY 
UNDER §70A-3-10Ml)(b) WHICH STATES THAT TO BE NEGOTIABLE 
AN INSTRUMENT MUST CONTAIN "NO OTHER PROMISE, ORDER, 
OBLIGATION OR POWER GIVEN BY THE MAKER OR DRAWER EXCEPT 
AS AUTHORIZED BY THIS CHAPTER; . . ."? 
The Court of Appeals' opinion does not mention, 
either in its recitation of facts or discussion, the undisputed 
fact that First Federal received the Air Terminal purchase 
agreement and note together as a package for security purposes 
which fact and surrounding circumstances are essential to 
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a fair analysis of the issues and of the trial courtfs decision. 
The above undisputed fact raises a number of pertinent questions 
in this case discussed hereinafter both as to negotiability 
and holder in due course status that would not exist in a 
situation where the holder received only the note, i.e.: 
(a) Whether the reference in the note to the 
accompanying purchase agreement for "additional rights 
of the holder hereof" is merely an inconsequential reference 
to a "separate" agreement under the statute which does 
not affect negotiability as the Court of Appeals determined, 
or is the reference more reasonably interpreted under 
the circumstances as wording of incorporation which adds 
an impermissible "promise, order, obligation or power" 
as the trial court held? 
(b) Whether the language "no other promise, order, 
obligation or power" in §70A-3~10Ml) (b) is a separate 
requirement for negotiability and not merely an additional 
test to determine whether an instrument is unconditional 
or conditional as the Court of Appeals seems to be saying? 
(c) Does "separate agreement" mean a situation 
where the accompanying agreement is not transferred as 
a part of the same package or where there is no wording 
that can reasonably be interpreted to be words of 
incorporation? 
(d) What is the legal effect of the knowledge of 
and notice to First Federal who prepared the joint assign-
ment to itself of the note and accompanying agreement 
as security for its loan to Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary? 
To be negotiable a promissory note must be the equivalent 
of cash and must strictly conform to the restrictions in the 
statute. Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co., et al., Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 
717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986). The principal statutory provision 
applicable to negotiability is §70A-3-104(l)(b) which states 
as follows: 
-m-
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument 
within this chapter must 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or 
order to pay a sum certain in money and no other 
promise, order, obligation or power given by the 
maker or drawer except as authorized by this 
chapter"; ] '. '. (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory powers given by the maker which escape the above 
prohibition on negotiability are listed in §70A-3~105 and 
§70A-3"112(1). Thus, if the instrument "contains" any "promise, 
order, obligation or power" other than those listed in the 
statute, then the instrument is not negotiable. 
In 5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §3-104:9, 
the above provision concerning "no other promise . . ."is 
discussed as follows: 
The language of the code provision under con-
sideration declaring that "no other promise . . . " 
may be included appears so categorical that it is 
concluded that it must be given its literal effect. 
This conclusion has the further advantage of 
practical expediency in that it avoids any question 
of construction as to whether an additional promise 
is or is not a promise of such a character as 
to impair negotiability. The above conclusion 
provides a standard which the ordinary man in 
business can apply for it merely requires the 
ability to read the words of the instrument and 
see if there is an additional promise. Otherwise 
stated, it avoids the complicated interpretation of 
additional words in an instrument and avoids the hazard 
that a court at a later date might not agree with 
the conclusion reached by the businessman reading the 
instrument. (Emphasis added.) 
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Courts which have addressed the applicability of the second 
part of subsection (b) of the above statutory provision have 
held it to be absolute in denying negotiability. In Geiger 
Finance Company v. Graham, 182 S.E.2d 521, 524 (GA 1971), 
the court stated that: 
If a writing contains any other promise, order, 
obligation or power, it is simply not a negotiable 
instrument and the concept of a holder in due course 
does not apply. . . . The intent is that a 
negotiable instrument carries nothing but the simple 
promise to pay, with certain limited exceptions. 
. . . 
The Court of Appeals' discussion of negotiability 
focuses on §70A-3~105(c) which allows the instrument to refer 
to or arise out of a separate agreement which may contain 
rights of prepayment and acceleration. The instrument may 
also contain a statement that it is secured by collateral 
and a right to realize or dispose of collateral under §70A-3~ 
112(1)(b). The Court of Appeals seems to be basing its dis-
cussion of negotiability principally on whether the promise 
or order is conditional or not under the first part of 
§70A-3~10Ml) (b) rather than the second part which appears 
to require that the instrument must also contain "no other 
promise, . . ." 
Although those two statutory requirements appear 
to be separate and distinct, the Court of Appeals combines 
them in its holding that the Air Terminal note is unconditional 
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and therefore negotiable. The problem is not whether the 
Air Terminal note may be conditional or unconditional under 
the first part but whether the instrument contains a prohibited 
promise, order, obligation or power which would separately 
preclude negotiability. The Air Terminal note contains the 
following words: 
Reference is made to the Purchase and Security 
Agreement for additional rights of the holder hereof. 
Even if the accompanying purchase agreement were ignored for 
the sake of argument, there are two related questions raised 
by the above wording in the Air Terminal note which must be 
answered to resolve the issue of negotiability. The first 
question is whether the words "additional rights" in the note 
are the equivalent of and have essentially the same meaning 
as a "promise, order, obligation or power" in the statute. 
It is submitted that the words "additional rights" in the 
Air Terminal note are the reasonable equivalent of and would 
be included at least under the word "power" contained in the 
statute. Webster defines a "right" as a power. See WebsterT s 
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 
G & C Merriam Company 1971. The second question then to be 
considered is what is the meaning of the word "contain" used 
in the statute and whether under such meaning the Air Terminal 
note "contains" any other power which would make the note 
non-negotiable. 
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Th e words in the note "for additional rights of 
the holder hereof" are most reasonably interpreted as words 
of incorporation because the holder is specifically directed 
to the holderTs rights in the accompanying purchase agreement 
which was contemporaneously transferred to First Federal with 
the note as a package. Those rights include a power of attorney 
and the right to execute documents, to charge expenses and 
pay taxes, among others. 
If the note had merely referred to the purchase 
agreement and not stated that the agreement contained "additional 
rights of the holder hereof" then perhaps there would not 
be an incorporation. The most reasonable interpretation of 
those words in the note is that the note and accompanying 
purchase agreement were to be construed as one document. 
Certainly First Federal considered the note and purchase 
agreement to be a single package because First Federal prepared 
the assignment which absolutely ties the two documents together. 
Even though a separate agreement does not affect 
negotiability under §70A-3-119(2) the question in this case 
is whether the accompanying purchase agreement should be 
considered as a "separate agreement." It is submitted that 
under the wording in the note and the fact of simultaneous 
assignment, the agreement in this case should not be considered 
as separate. 5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §3-101:15 
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states that ". . -if there is any doubt as to whether a paper 
is negotiable, it is held to be non-negotiable," The obvious 
policy reason for the above rule is to prevent claims of 
negotiability in doubtful situations such as this one. 
In 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §44(b) it is stated 
as follows: 
. . . where several instruments are made as 
part of one transaction, they will be read together, 
and each will be construed with reference to the 
other, notes or bills of exchange and contemporaneous 
written agreements executed as part of the same 
transaction are to be construed together as forming one 
contract in a controversy between the original parties 
or persons standing in their situation or charged with 
notice of the contemporaneous agreements. 
This general rule applies especially where the agree-
ment relates to consideration yet to be earned, or 
where the note contains an express reference to the 
agreement, '. '. ". (Emphasis added.) 
Also see 5 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §§3~104:7; 
3-119:6; Bank of Kimball v. Rostek, 423 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1967). 
Any provision in the subject instrument that creates uncertainty 
eliminates negotiability. 
None of the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals 
to support its holding of negotiability, Third National Bank 
in Nashville v. Handi-Gardens Supply of Illinois, Inc., 
380 F.Supp 930 (D. Tenn. 1979); Federal Factors, Inc. v. 
Wellbanke, 241 Ark. 44, 406 S.W.2d 712 (Ark. 1966); and First 
National City Bank v. Valentine, 62 Misc. 2d 719, 309 N.Y.S.2d 
563 (NY 1970), involve a situation where the note and 
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accompanying purchase agreement were taken simultaneously 
as a single package pursuant to the holder's own words of 
assignment. 
Question II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT 
THE AIR TERMINAL NOTE WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE AND FIRST 
FEDERAL WAS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE CONFLICTS 
WITH THIS COURT'S DECISION IN CALFO V. D.C. 
STEWART CO., ET AL., 30 UTAH ADV. REP. B, 717 P.2d 697 
(UTAH 198b), CONCERNING WHAT CONSTITUTES NOTICE TO AND 
KNOWLEDGE OF A POTENTIAL INFIRMITY TO A HOLDER SUCH 
AS FIRST FEDERAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HEREIN? 
This court stated in Calfo, cited above, at 717 
P.2d 697, 700 that: 
. . . if the document evinces terms which should 
alert the transferee of possible defenses, then the 
transferee is not entitled to insulation from those 
apparent defenses. 
The Court of Appeals wrongly interpreted the Calfo 
decision to mean that the Court of Appeals could ignore the 
accompanying Air Terminal purchase agreement regardless of 
the undisputed and critical fact that First Federal took the 
two documents as a security package pursuant to First Federal's 
own wording. 
Question III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY 
REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT (A) BY HOLDING THAT FIRST FEDERAL 
WAS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE BECAUSE IT HAD NO NOTICE OF 
A CLAIM OR DEFENSE UNDER §70A-3~30^(2) EVEN THOUGH GUMP 
& AYERS, A FIDUCIARY, RECEIVED $18,500 FROM THE $100,000 
LOAN FIRST FEDERAL MADE TO GUMP & AYERS BECAUSE RECEIPT 
OF SUCH AMOUNT BY GUMP & AYERS WAS NOT A "BENEFIT" UNDER 
THE STATUTE, AND (B) BY WHOLLY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
ANOTHER PORTION OF §70A-3~30^ 4 (2) UNDER WHICH FIRST 
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FEDERAL WAS ABSOLUTELY CHARGED WITH NOTICE OP A CLAIM 
WHEN GUMP & AYERS, A FIDUCIARY, ASSIGNED THE AIR TERMINAL 
NOTE AND ACCOMPANYING AGREEMENT TO FIRST FEDERAL AS 
SECURITY FOR GUMP & AYERS' OWN $100,000 DEBT? 
Question IV. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRET 
§70A-3-119(D and §70A~3~30Ml) IN HOLDING THAT FIRST 
FEDERAL WAS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE EVEN THOUGH FIRST 
FEDERAL RECEIVED THE AIR TERMINAL NOTE AND AGREEMENT 
TOGETHER AND EVEN THOUGH THE AGREEMENT INDICATED THAT 
THERE WERE LIMITATIONS AND THAT AIR TERMINAL'S OBLIGATION 
WAS PARTLY OR WHOLLY VOIDABLE? 
Even if the Air Terminal note were considered to 
be negotiable for the sake of argument, First Federal would 
not be a holder in due course. Section 70A-3"119(1) provides 
that a holder in due course is not affected by any limitation 
in the separate agreement "lt_ he had no notice of the limitation 
when he took the instrument. . . . " (Emphasis added.) First 
Federal knew about the Morse problem prior to the assignment 
and then later at the time of assignment, First Federal knew 
that the purchase agreement specifically gave Air Terminal 
default rights and indemnified Air Terminal against the Morse 
problem. Because First Federal had notice of those limitations 
in the agreement, it cannot be a holder in due course under 
§70A-3-119(D. 
First Federal also had notice of a claim or defense 
under §70A-3~304(1)(b) and (2) (Utah Code Ann. 1953) which 
provides that: 
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense 
if: . . . 
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation 
of any party is voidable in whole or in part, . . . 
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(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against 
the instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary 
has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as 
security for his own debt or in any transaction for 
his own benefit . ] ] (Emphasis added.) 
When First Federal made the $100,000 loan to Gump 
& Ayers, it knew that it was making a portion of the loan because 
of the Morse problem against which Air Terminal was clearly 
indemnified and for which Air Terminal had default rights. 
Because First Federal had actual knowledge and notice of the 
Morse problem and of Air Terminal's other rights, including 
indemnity contained in the purchase agreement at the time of 
the loan to Gump & Ayers, Air Terminal's rights to a set-off 
or default remedies were no longer merely potential or theoretical 
and Air Terminal's obligation was then known by First Federal 
to be voidable in whole or in part under subsection (b) above. 
The Court of Appeals cites Sundsvallsbanken v. Fondmetal, 
Inc., et al., 624 F.Supp. 8ll, 8l6-l8 (D. N.Y. 1985), as a 
case in which "the precise issue was addressed.T! The Court 
of Appeals' reliance on Sundsvallsbanken is misplaced because 
the court in that case specifically held that an earlier separate 
indemnity agreement was released by the maker upon execution 
of the subsequent renewal note sued upon (Note C) and that 
said agreement, even if it were established, had "no relationship 
to the obligation" under Note C which had been later executed 
at the request of the maker. 
Section 70A-3"304(2) states that a purchaser has 
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knowledge of a claim if he has knowledge that a fiduciary has 
negotiated the instrument "as security for his own debt . . ." 
It is undisputed that Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary, and so known 
to First Federal, negotiated the Air Terminal note to First 
Federal as security for Gump & Ayers' own debt evidenced by 
Gump & AyersT $100,000 note to First Federal. That fact alone 
precludes First Federal from being a holder in due course. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion does not discuss that provision of 
the above statute which appears to control the issue in this case. 
In addition, there was no evidence that the $18,500 
portion of the $100,000 note was to repay a debt owed to Gump 
& Ayers by Morse, the contractor on the Sunayers project, as 
the Court of Appeals concluded. Thus, the Court of Appeals' 
holding that Gump & Ayers received no direct "benefit" under 
the statute from the $18,500 is merely an unsupported and unwarranted 
conclusion. Moreover, §70A-3~304(2) does not differentiate 
between direct and indirect "benefit" to a fiduciary as the 
Court of Appeals does. It is submitted that the Court of Appeals' 
definition of "benefit" under the statute is too narrow because 
in this case it must be presumed that even if the entire $100,000 
was used for the Sunayers project it clearly resulted in a 
substantial benefit to Gump & Ayers who was the general partner 
and owned at least sixty-five percent (65%) of Sunayers. (Purchase 
Agreement page 1). First Federal cannot be a holder in due course 
because it had abundant actual and statutory notice and knowledge 
of the problems. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals wrongly ignored the accompanying 
purchase agreement in determining that the Air Terminal note 
was negotiable even though First Federal took the two documents 
as integral parts of the same package. In regard to the question 
whether First Federal was a holder in due course, it is undisputed 
that First Federal had abundant knowledge and notice of limitations 
and problems and at the very least knew that Gump & Ayers, 
a fiduciary, negotiated the Air Terminal note to First Federal 
as security for Gump & Ayers own $100,000 debt. It is submitted 
that the Court of Appeals wrongly interpreted the applicable 
statutes and the Calfo decision, that this is an important 
case of first impression, and that Air Terminalfs petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ /-"aay of April, 1989. 
WALTER P. FABER, JR., Attorney 
for Petitioner Air Terminal 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the fore-
going to John W. Lowe, 50 West 300 South, Fourth Floor, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84101, postage prepaid, this OT/^fay of April, 1989. 
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Examination, the manager continued to assert 
V 1 Brown had one foot outside the ston 
ben stopped by the security officer. Simil 
ark, the security officer testified Brown was 
oun of the store when apprehended, "rfie 
manager did not recall if Brown had slaid 
something to the effect that he was not oupide 
the store, while the security officer thought 
such A statement might have been made/ The 
manager also testified he saw Brown riut the 
cigarettes in the grocery cart, exit thy store, 
and ride\ his bike past the store twic/, while 
looking in the store window. We find/that the 
evidence was overwhelming as to/Brown's 
intent to steal the cigarettes and ary not con-
vinced thank is reasonably likely that Brown's 
testimony would have produced dJ\ acquittal. 
Therefore, the error in denying x\fe motion in 
limine was hawnless 
Brown also\claims the trial ciurt erred by 
refusing to grant a new trial lycause a juror 
had allegedly lied during voir dire questioning 
and had made\ derogatory /emarks about 
Brown prior to \ury deliberations. In McDo-
nough Power Equipment, Inf. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548 «984), thfe United States 
Supreme Court adnressed /he applicable test 
where a juror had allegedly failed to disclose 
information during vpir d/re questioning. The 
Court said, 
We hold that toWtain a new trial 
in such a situation, a party must 
first demonstrate Aat a juror failed 
to answer honestMa material que-
stion on voir dire, ^nd then further 
show that a correct response would 
have provided /a valitf basis for a 
challenge for capse. 
464 U.S. at 556. \k this casfc, the juror alleg-
edly failed to dispose that he had had retail 
experience. However, Brown uailed to prove 
that the juror acftially had sucA experience and 
further failed xa demonstrate that there would 
have been "a /valid basis for \challenge for 
cause." 
In regard / to the allegedly\ prejudicial 
remarks made by one juror, the tnWl court met 
with the juw after receiving a note from the 
jury. The mal court then further\instructed 
the jurors/on their responsibilities. Wter the 
jury rendered its verdict, the trial coujt polled 
each juror and asked whether the veraict was 
infiuenceo by anything other than properly 
presented evidence and the court's instructions 
on the flaw. Each juror responded appropria-
tely. Rurther, after the motion for a nem trial 
was filed, the trial court found that the alleged 
statements of one juror were "ambiguous rod 
subj/ct to multiple interpretation" and mat 
they did not constitute a predetermination W 
guilt nor direct prejudice against Brown. Tr\e 
trial court's decision on a motion for a nei 
pal is largely within the court's discretion^ 
nd will not be reversed on appeal unless there 
a clear abuse of that discretion. State/ 
jiams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)/We 
find no abuse of discretion in the triaL^ourt's 
refusalNo grant a new trial becaus$/of impr-
oper juror\ctions. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Gr^nwood, Juj*£e 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings,"5^6ge 
I CONCUR IN THp^E&JLT: 
Russell W. Bereft, JudgeN 
1. In Wight,ytt analyzed the facts ihtfer 609(a)(1) 
because the/prior crime was punishable lw impriso 
nment in/<xcess of one year. Id. That secthsm is no 
applicatte in this case because the prior conviction: 
are for misdemeanors. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of 
Salt Lake City (''First Federal") brought suit 
against Air Terminal Gifts, Inc. ("Air Term-
inal") on a promissory note executed by Air 
Terminal and payable to Sunayers Limited 
Partnership ("Sunayers"). The Air Terminal 
note had been assigned to First Federal by 
Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. ("Gump & 
Ayers"), the general partner of Sunayers. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
found the note was not negotiable and First 
Federal was not a holder in due course. First 
Federal takes exception to both rulings, clai-
ming it is entitled to enforce the note notwit-
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hstanding any claims or defenses of Air Ter-
minal. We agree, and reverse and remand this 
case for further proceedings consistent with 
our opinion. 
FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. Sunayers was 
developing a condominium project in St. 
George, Utah called Sunflower. On June 5, 
1984, Air Terminal invested $200,000 in the 
Sunayers Limited Partnership by paying 
$75,000 in cash and executing a $125,000 
promissory note ("'the Air Terminal note") 
secured by a Purchase and Security Agree-
ment. The note provides: "This Note is 
secured by that certain Purchase and Security 
Agreement date June , 1984. Reference is 
made to the Purchase and Security Agreement 
for additional rights of the holder hereof. * 
On June 27, 1984, Gump & Ayers, the 
general partner of Sunayers, executed a pro-
missory note in the amount of $100,000 ("the 
Gump & Ayers note") payable to First 
Federal. Gump & Ayers assigned the Air 
Terminal note as further security for the loan 
to Sunayers. The proceeds from the Gump & 
Ayers note were to be used by Sunayers for 
debts incurred in developing the Sunflower 
project, one of which was described as the 
"Morse Shortfall." Morse was the contractor 
on the Sunflower project, and pan of the 
Morse Shortfall was an $18,500 debt due 
Gump & Ayers. 
Air Terminal claims the language in its note 
referring to the Purchase and Security Agree-
ment for "additional rights of the holder 
hereof makes the note non-negotiable. Air 
Terminal further claims that even if the note is 
negotiable, First Federal is not a holder in due 
course because it took the note with notice of 
claims made by and defenses of Air Terminal. 
Specifically, Air Terminal claims First Federal 
knew a portion of the proceeds from the loan 
would be used to pay Gump & Ayers as part 
of the Morse Shortfall. According to the 
Purchase and Security Agreement, Air Term-
inal was to be indemnified by Sunayers and 
Gump & Ayers from any obligations arising 
from the Morse Shortfall. 
There are two issues on appeal. First, is the 
Air Terminal note a negotiable instrument? 
Second, is First Federal a holder in due course 
of the Air Terminal note? 
Since our task is to interpret the language of 
the Air Terminal note to determine if it is 
negotiable, and on undisputed facts, determine 
if First Federal is a holder in due course, we 
accord the trial court's conclusions no defer-
ence but review for a correction of error. See, 
e.g., Cornish Town v. KoUer, 758 P.2d 919, 
921 (Utah 1988). 
NEGOTIABILITY 
The trial court held the Air Terminal note 
was not a negotiable instrument because the 
"" UTAH ADVA 
note referenced "additional rights" provided 
for in the Purchase and Security Agreement 
thereby creating additional powers and pro-
mises outside those provided in the note itself. 
We must decide whether the "reference" in the 
Air Terminal note to the Purchase and Secu-
rity Agreement "for additional rights" creates 
an additional "promise" or "power" under 
controlling statutory language which renders 
the note non-negotiable. 
When determining negotiability, only the 
instrument in question should be examined. 
Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697, 700 
(Utah 1986). See also First State Bank at 
Gallup v. Clark, 91 N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144, 
1146 (1977). In order for a writing to be a 
negotiable instrument, it must "contain an 
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
certain in money and no other promise, order, 
obligation or power given by the maker or 
drawer except as authorized by this chapter." 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-104(l)(a) (1988) 
(emphasis added). A promise or order, othe-
rwise unconditional, does not become condit-
ional simply because the instrument ''refers to 
or states that it. arises our of a separate agre-
ement or refers to a separate agreement for 
rights as to prepayment or acceleration. ..." 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-105(l)(c) (1988) 
(emphasis added). In contrast, a promise or 
order is conditional if the instrument "states 
that it is subject to or governed by any other 
agreement." Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-
105(2)(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Negotiabi-
lity is not, however, affected by "a statement 
that collateral has been given to secure oblig-
ations either on the instrument or otherwise of 
an obligor on the instrument or that in the 
case of default on those obligations the holder 
may realize on or dispose of the collateral ...." 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-l 12(1 Kb) (1988). 
Thus, the issue is whether the Air Terminal 
note simply refers to or is governed by the 
Purchase and Security Agreement. The lang-
uage of the relevant clause, providing that 
"reference is made to the Purchase and Secu-
rity Agreement" persuades us that the note is 
negotiable under §70A-3-105(l)(c). 
Cases from other jurisdictions interpreting 
similar provisions support our conclusion. See, 
e.g., Third Natl Bank in Nashville v. Hardi-
Gardens Supply of Illinois, 380 F. Supp. 930, 
938 (D. Tenn. 1974)(an obligation is not made 
conditional because the instrument refers to or 
states that it arises out of a separate agree-
ment); Federal Factors, Inc. v. Wellbanke, 241 
Ark. 44, 406 S.W.2d 712, 713 (1966)("The 
mere reference to the transaction giving rise to 
the instruments does not affect negotiabi-
lity.");; and 5 R. Anderson, Uniform Comm-
ercial Code §3-105:12 at 236 (3d ed. 
1984K"The fact that a reference to collateral 
security for commercial paper may be ineptly 
worded does not impair negotiability when the 
sense of the provision is that something is, 
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added rather than subtracted from the oblig-
ation of the commercial paper.")(citing First 
Natl City Bank v. Valentine, 62 Mis.2d 719, 
309 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1970)). 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the Air 
Terminal note is a negotiable instrument. 
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE 
A holder in due course is "a holder who 
takes the instrument for value; and in good 
faith; and without notice that it is overdue or 
has been dishonored or of any defense against 
or claim to it on the pan of any person." 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-302(l)(c) (1988) 
(emphasis added). Air Terminal claims First 
Federal is not a holder in due course of the 
Air Terminal note for two reasons. First, it 
claims First Federal had notice that Air Ter-
minal's obligation was voidable in whole or in 
part under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-
304(1 )(b) (1988). Second, Air Terminal claims 
First Federal had notice of a claim against the 
note under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-304(2) 
(1988). 
Section 70A-3-304(l)(b) states, with our 
emphasis, a "purchaser has notice of a claim 
or defense if ... the purchaser has notice that 
the obligation of any party is voidable in 
uhole or in part, or that all parties have been 
discharged." Under the Purchase and Security 
Agreement, Air Terminal was to be indemni-
fied for any reduction in capital or income 
based on claims against Sunayers due to the 
Morse Shortfall. Air Terminal claims that 
because First Federal had notice of this prov-
ision, a fact not in dispute, and the loan to 
Sunayers which involved the assignment of the 
Air Terminal note was to pay the Morse 
Shortfall, Air Terminars obligation to pay 
was voidable, thus, First Federal is not a 
holder in due course. 
In Sundsvallsbanken v. Fondmctal, Inc., 
624 F. Supp. 811 (D. N.Y. 1985), this precise 
issue was addressed. The payee bank brought 
an action to collect on a renewal promissory 
note. An indemnity agreement executed in 
connection with the note, contained a provi-
sion by which the payee bank had a duty to 
indemnify the maker against certain claims. 
The Ne* York District Court held that the 
duty to indemnify the makers from certain 
claims did not preclude collection on the note. 
In so holding, the court declared that any 
claim on the indemnity provision could be 
asserted as a counterclaim, but the provision 
did not permit the maker to 'avoid* the 
note's obligation. Id. at 818. In support of its 
holding, the court stated, "[the]... inclusion of 
the word 'voidable* [in U.C.C. §3-
304(1 Kb)]1 is meant to restrict the provision to 
notice of a defense which will permit any 
party to avoid his original obligation on the 
nstrument as distinguished from a setoff or 
:ounterclaim." Id. (referring to the Official 
Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code). 
Similarly, the Purchase and Security Agre-
ement gives Air Terminal the right to indem-
nification from Sunayers for any reduction in 
capital of the Sunayers Limited Partnership 
resulting from the Morse Shortfall, but it does 
not render Air Terminal's obligation on the 
note voidable under §70A-3-304(l)(b). 
Instead, Air Terminal's right to partial inde-
mnification from Sunayers is independent of 
its obligation to pay on the Air Terminal note. 
Air Terminal may have a separate claim for 
indemnification against Sunayers or Gump & 
Ayers, but it cannot use this claim as a 
defense to its obligations to First Federal on 
the note. 
Air Terminal also argues First Federal is not 
a holder in due course of the Air Terminal 
note under Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-304(2) 
which provides: 
"The purchaser has notice of a ^ 
claim against the instrument when 
he has knowledge that a fiduciary 
has negotiated the instrument... in 
any transactions for his own benefit 
or otherwise in breach of duty." 
Specifically, Air Terminal claims Gump & 
Ayers, as general partner of Sunayers, negot-
iated the note and $18,500 of the $100,000 
proceeds from the First Federal loan was paid 
by Sunayers to satisfy a previous debt owed to 
Gump & Ayers as part of the Morse Shortfall. 
Accordingly, Air Terminal asserts First 
Federal knew the loan was obtained for the 
"benefit" of Gump & Ayers, a fiduciary of Air 
Terminal, in contravention of §70A-3-
304(2). 
There is no question that Gump & Ayers, as 
general partner of Sunayers, was a fiduciary to 
Air Terminal and that proceeds of the loan 
were used to satisfy debts of the Sunayers 
development project for which Air Terminal 
•had given its note. However, Air Terminal 
cites no authority for the proposition that 
these facts alone establish that its note was 
negotiated "for the benefit" of Gump & 
Ayers. Furthermore, the case law interpreting 
provisions identical to §70A-3-304(2) 
require a more substantial link to the fiduc-
iary's persona] interests than exists here. See, 
e.g., Nashville City Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Masseyf 540 F. Supp. 566, 578 (D. Ga. 
1982)("having made a personal loan to Mr. 
Thigpen and having permitted him as general 
partner-a fiduciary-to assign promissory 
notes which were payable to the limited part-
nership as security for his personal loan, the 
plaintiff bank, as a matter of law, took each 
of the promissory notes with 'notice of a 
claim against the instrument' and thus is not a 
holder in due course"). 
Unlike the facts in Nashville City Bank, the 
indirect benefit received by Gump & Ayers of 
having a bona fide debt, owed to it by Suna-
yers, repaid out of the proceeds of the loan is 
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not the type of "benefit" proscribed by §70A-
3-304(2) 
Air Terminal also asserts First Federal knew 
the note negotiated by Gump & Ayers was in 
breach of dut> because First Federal knew the 
proceeds were to be used to satisfy the Morse 
Shortfall and that Air Terminal was to be 
indemnified from the Morse Shortfall under 
the Purchase and Security Agreement 
As previously discussed, we consider Air 
Terminal's claim for indemnification against 
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers as a claim ind-
ependent of its liability on the note Despite 
the indemnity provisions, Gump & Ayers had 
the right to assign Air Terminal's negotiable 
note for the benefit of Sunayers, and did not 
breach its fiduciary duty in doing so The 
assignment of the note does not vitiate Air 
Terminal's claim of indemnification against 
Gump & Ayers and Sunayers for funds expe-
nded to satisfy the Morse Shortfall In 
summary, we do not find §70A-3-304(2) 
defeats First Federal's status as a holder m 
due course 
We hold that the Air Terminal note is a 
negotiable instrument and First Federal is a 
holder in due course The judgment of the 
trial court is, therefore, reversed, and the case 
is remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion 
Judith M Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Regnal W Garff, Judge 
Richard C Davidson, Judge 
1 Utah Code Ann §70A-3-304(l)(b) the pro 
vision at issue in this case, is identical to §3 
304(1 )(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code referred 
to b> the court in SundsvaJlsbankcn 
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DAVIDSO^u Judge: 7 
Jack C Daniels appeals from a summan 
judgment in favor of Deseret federal Sa\ings 
& Loan Association, dismissing his notice to 
hold and claim a lien on prodem for which he 
was both a co-owner and rhe general contr 
actor Daniels' claim concerned the timeliness 
of filing his notrce and tne profits owed to 
him as a limiteck partndT in Park Avenue 
Development Comnany (yPark Avenue') The 
trial court held thatyiis l/en was both untimel> 
and invalid We affirm / 
F^CTS 
In 1980, Daniels invested approximateh 
$28,000 m the develArWent of an eight-unit 
condominium proje/t In Park Cit\, Utah 
thereby acquiring an interest through a limited 
partnership in ParJc Avenue The agreement 
between Park Avenue arid Daniels provided 
that Daniels would recdive approximately 
$80,000 for his pare in the profits from the 
saJe of the condominiums and for overhead 
Park Avenue alio hired Daniels to serve as the 
general contractor for thd condominium 
project and aareed to pay him approximately 
$ 15,000 for hit services \ 
On Augus( 14, 1980, Deserdt approved a 
construction loan to Park Aventie and const 
ruction on^ie project commenced B> the end 
of July 1991, Daniels had completed all of the 
construction required pursuant to uhe constr-
uction contract and Park City issutd certific-
ates of una! inspection and occupanVy for the 
project/Daniels was paid $15,000 fo\ services 
and labor, but was not paid his promised 
share if the profits from the sale of wie con-
dominiums \ 
Apparently, Daniels intended to file aViotice 
to h61d and claim a hen on the project, far the 
$80,(000 "profit/ within the statutory ptnod 
reouired for filing However, the owneri of 
try project were trying to obtain refinancing 
arid they requested Daniels not to file bis 
mechanic's ben for the profit and overhead 
In leturn, the owners promised Daniels thai 
fthey would allocate his share of the profits ta 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
WALTER P. FADER, JR. (A1026) 
Attorney for Air Terminal 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 8*4109 
Telephone: 486-5634 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
?IRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
\SSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
SUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
and AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC., 
Defendants. 
MR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC., 
Crossclaimant, 
vs. 
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
VICTOR R. AYERS, MICHAEL A. SASS, 
JERRY W. FLOOR, GRANT THORNTON, 
a partnership, MARY KAY GRIFFIN, 
and JOHN DOES I-III, inclusive, 
Crossclaim Defendants. 
JERRY W. FLOOR, 
Crossclaimant 
and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., 
n/k/a V & A, INC., SUNAYERS LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, and VICTOR R. AYERS, 
Crossclaim Defendants, 
FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN REGARD 
TO SEVERED ISSUES OF 
NEGOTIABILITY AND HOLDER IN 
DUE COURSE STATUS BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC. 
Civil No. C86-1224 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
-and-
-2-
MARJORIE B. GUMP, MARION P. 
AYERS, FOX & COMPANY, MARY KAY 
GRIFFIN, SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG 
& HANSON, and CHARLES R. BROWN, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
VICTOR R. AYERS, MARION P. AYL1RS, 
MARJORIE B. GUMP, and GUMP R AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC. n/k/a V & A, 
INC., 
Fourth-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
5RANT THORNTON, a partnership, 
Fourth-Party Defendant. 
The separate trial of the first and severed phase of 
the above case between plaintiff Fjrst Federal and defendant Air 
Terminal Gifts, Inc., concerning the principal issues whether the 
oromissory note signed by Air Terminal was a negotiable instrument 
and whether First Federal was a holder in due course thereof, regular 
came on for non-jury trial before the above-entitled court on the 
30th day of December, 1987, pursuant to the prior determination 
by the Court that there was no just reason to delay the trial of 
and entry of Judgment as to such issues, the Honorable Pat B. Brian 
presiding, First Federal being represented by its counsel John 
W. Lowe, Air Terminal being represented by its counsel, Walter 
P. Faber, Jr., and no other parties appearing or being represented, 
and the parties having previous]y filed extensive written memoranda 
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iscussing the facts and legal issues and having introduced evidence, 
aving rested and then presented final oral arguments, and the 
ourt having considered the evidence, statutes, legal authorities 
n... arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, and after 
caring objections to the court's propound findings and conclusions, 
.rid after due deliberation, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 5, 198'l Air Terminal agreed to invest $200,000 
.n and become a limited partner in the Sunayers Limited Partnership 
>f which Gump & Ayers was the general partner. 
2. On that date Air Terminal paid $75,000 in cash and 
executed a thirteen page Purchase and Security Agreement ("purchase 
Lgreement") and a contemporaneous and integrated companion promissory 
iote payable in three installments in the total principal amount 
)f $125,000 plus interest. 
3- At the time the purchase agreement and note were signed 
representatives of Gump & Ayers told Air Terminal that the purchase 
lgreement and note were companion parts erf the same transaction and 
protected Air Terminal from separate suit on the note. 
k. The purchase agreement specifically incorporates 
bhe note and contains a number of additional rights of and limitations 
3n the parties. 
5. A provision in the purchase agreement indemnifies 
Air Terminal against any claim involving Morse, the prior contractor 
on the Sunayers' project. 
6. The note contains the following statement on its 
face just above the signature line: 
Reference is made to tho Purchase and Security 
Agreement for additional rights of the holder hereof. 
7. The purchase agreement and note were executed at 
bhe same time as companion parts of a contemporaneous, integrated, 
oackage transaction. 
8. Thereafter, on June 27, 1984, Gump & Ayers, the 
general partner of Sunayers, borrowed $J00,000 from First Federal 
principally in connection with the Sunayers1 project and signed 
a promissory note for that amount, which Gump & AyersT note was 
due on December 15, 198*4. 
9. Gump & Ayerr, told First Federal prior to the $100,000 
loan that a major portion of the Joan was to pay f or a previous 
shortfall caused by Morse, thf* prior contractor on the Sunayers1 
project. 
10. A portion ol the $ LOO,000 loan amount requested to 
cover the Morse shortfall was allocated directly to Gump & Ayers. 
11. On June 27, 1984 in connection with the $100,000 loan 
Gump & Ayers assigned the Air Terminal purchase agreement and note 
as a package to First Federal who was the author of and typed on the 
bottom of the Air Terminal note the following words of assignment: 
Sunayers hereby assigns, with recourse, all of 
its right, title and interest in the above promissory 
note and the agreement securing it to First Federal 
Savings and Loan Assn. of Salt Lake City, 
Sunayers Limited Partnership 
By Gump and Ayers 
Real Estate, Inc. 
Its General Partner 
-5-
12, The Gump & Ayers1 note for $100,000 dated June 
>7, 1984 was prepared by First Federal and links together the Air 
'erminal note and purchase agreement by the following statement 
/hich is typed on the bottom ol the Gump & Ayersf note: 
The indebtedness evidenced by this note is secured 
by a Promissory Note dated June 5, 198*1 and a Se^^t-^ 
Agreement of even date. 
13. First Federal did not notify Air Terminal of the 
assignment and so Air Terminal paid the December 1, 1984 principal 
Installment on the Air Terminal note of $41,666.67 plus interest 
be Gump & Ayers. Air Terminal was given credit for its payment. 
1*1. On December IS, 198^ 1 Gump & Ayers executed a second 
Dromissory note to First Federal lor $85,221.31 which note renewed 
the first Gump & Ayers' note ol $100,000 dated June 27, 1984. 
This second Gump & Ayers' note contained the identical statement 
as had the first Gump & Ayersf note that the Air Terminal note 
and purchase agreement were security therefor. 
15. In the spring ol 1985 Air Terminal discovered that 
some ol the representations originally made to induce Air Terminal 
to invest in Sunayers were untrue. Consequently, Air Terminal 
refused to make the second installment payment on the Air Terminal 
note which payment was due on June 1, 1985. 
16. On June 13, 19^5 after the Air Terminal note was 
in default, Gump & Ayers executed a third promissory note for 
$85,221.31 to First Federal, which third note renewed the second 
Gump & Ayers' note for $85,221.31 dated December 15, 1984. The 
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:hird Gump & Ayers' note also contained the same identical security 
statement as had the first two Gump & Ayers! notes, 
17. First Federal first notified Air Terminal in August, 
L985 that the Air Terminal note had been assigned to First Federal 
md requested that payment of the past due second installment be 
nade to First Federal. 
18. When Air Terminal refused to make further payments 
on the note, First Federal commenced action against Gump & Ayers 
Dn its note and against Air Terminal on its note, 
19. Air Terminal answered that its note was not negotiable 
that First Federal was not a holder in due course thereof, and 
that First Federal was subject to all defenses Air Terminal could 
assert against Gump & Ayers and Sunayers. 
20. The court previously granted summary judgment in 
favor of First Federal and against Gump & Ayers on its note dated 
June 13, 1985. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
the issues. 
2. The Air Terminal purchase agreement and note were 
executed at the same time as part of a single package and were 
intended by Gump & Ayers and Air Terminal to be companion parts 
of an integrated transaction and were not to be considered separately 
-7-
3. By its wording, the Air Terminal note incorporates 
the additional rights of the holder contained in the purchase 
agreement* 
*J. The rights oi the holder contained in the purchase 
agreement are in addition to and exceed the statutory rights of 
prepayment and acceleration. 
5. The Air Terminal purchase agreement and note were 
contemporaneously assigned as a package to First Federal who treated 
:hem together as a single integrated transaction from the time 
}f the assignment to First Federal. 
6. Because it contains other rights granted by Air 
Terminal, the Air Terminal note is not a negotiable instrument. 
7. First Federal knew and was given notice of the Morse 
shortfall prior to making the $100,000 loan to Gump & Ayers. 
8. First Federal had notice of the rights and limitations 
contained in the purchase agreement and knew that Gump & Ayers 
was a fiduciary at the time of the assignment to First Federal 
of the Air Terminal note. 
9. Gump & Ayers assigned the Air Terminal note to First 
Federal as security for Gump & Ayersf own debt and for Gump & AyersT 
own benefit as well as to obtain funds for Sunayers. 
10. First Federal was a purchaser of the Air Terminal 
note from Gump & Ayers, had notice of a claim and limitations and 
is not a holder in due course of the note. 
11. First Federal is subject to the defenses Air Terminal 
is entitled to assert against Gump & Ayers and Sunayers. 
-8-
12. There is no just reason to delay judgment of the 
issues concerning negotiability and holder in due course, and there-
fore the court expressly determines that judgment be entered in 
favor of defendant Air Terminal and against plaintiff First Federal 
on those issues. 
DATED this _5th d ay oi February, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
s * 
s/ Pat B. Brian 
PAT B. BRIAN, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing 
John W. Lowe, 50 West Broadway, #*400, Salt Lake City, UT, and 
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455 South 300 East, #300 185 South State 
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MICHAEL A. SASS, Pro Se DAVID R. OLSEN 
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CALFO v. D.C. 
Cltea*717P.2d 
ause the impoundment and searc 
jrere ^ admittedly a pretext concealing/an 
iovestiga<pry police motive, the evidence 
ieJ2ed wasSmproperly admitted at/mal un-
(Jcr the fourrfc amendment of/rfie United 
gates Constitution. 711 P.2# at 270. We 
igain note that nerbher papty has discussed 
or applied article 1, sfc£iron 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution k / the facts of the in-
itant case, and therefore\ve do not here 
consider any septate state standards. See 
ftaie v. Earl/supra. 
Defendam's convictions of po!vsession 
uid po/session with the intent to distribute 
jQntfolled substances are reversed and 
E>4«3 — 
elo CALFO, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
I.C. STEWART CO., Clara J. DeGraff, 
dba CJ. Realty and Roland Vance, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 19309. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 25, 198G. 
Holder brought action against promis-
ir realtor and realtor's agent, as guaran-
r, upon promissory note issued by prom-
ior to realtor and sold to holder by real-
ms agent. The Third District Court, Salt 
ike County, David B. Dee, J., entered 
ir-TW7 judgment for holder and granted 
sinissor indemnity against realtor and re-
tor's agent, and upon promissor's motion 
, strike, entered order eliminating interest 
id stating that summary judgment was 
ftperly signed and entered and in full 
itce and effect, and promissor appealed 
cm guch order. The Supreme Court, Zim-
^man, J., held that: (1) time for taking 
STEWART CO. Utah 697 
697 (Utah 1986) 
appeal did not begin to run until entry of 
order stating that summary judgment was 
properly signed and entered, and (2) prom-
issory note stating that note was due in full 
upon final closing between promissor and 
buyers, which would be on or before cer-
tain date, when buyers would exercise their 
option to purchase motel, was not nego-
tiable instrument. 
Reversed and remanded with di-
rections. 
1. Appeal and Error <e=*347(2) 
Time for taking appeal from judgment 
did not begin to run until entry of order 
stating that previous summary judgment 
was properly signed and entered and in full 
force and effect, where form of prior sum-
mary judgment had not been served upon 
defendant prior to submission to trial court, 
as required by local rule. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 58A(c); Rule 73(a) (Repealed). 
2. Bills and Notes e=>144 
To' be negotiable under Uniform Com-
mercial Code, instrument must evidence 
signature by maker or drawer, contain un-
conditional promise or order to pay sum 
certain in money, be payable on demand or 
at definite time and be payable to order or 
to bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.A.1953, 
70A-3-104. 
3. Bills and Notes e»144 
To qualify as negotiable instrument 
under Uniform Commercial Code, promise 
to pay and certainty of payment must be 
unequivocal. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C.A. 
1953, 70A-3-104. 
4. Bills and Notes *»144 
Instrument's negotiability must be de-
terminable from what appears on face of 
instrument, without reference to extrinsic 
facts. U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1), 3-105 comment; 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-104. 
5. Bills and Notes *»144 
Purpose of requirement that instru-
ment's negotiability be determinable from 
what appears on face of instrument is to 
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protect transferees from latent defenses to 
payment U.C.C. § 3-104(1). 
6. Bills and Notes <3=>342 
Transferee is not entitled to insulation 
from apparent defenses where negotiable 
instrument evinces terms which should 
alert transferee of possible defenses. 
U.C.C §§ 3-104(1), 3-105 comment; U.C.A. 
1953, 70A-3-104. 
7. Bills and Notes <s=>164 
Promissory note issued by seller to 
realtor, stating that note was due in full 
upon final closing between seller and buy-
ers, which would be on or before certain 
date, when buyers would exercise option to 
purchase motel, was conditional and indefi-
nite on its face, and thus, was not nego-
tiable instrument. U.C.C. § 3-104(1); U.C. 
A.1953, 70A-3-104. 
8. Bills and Notes e=>452<l), 452(3) 
Promissor's defenses of lack of consid-
eration, nonmaturity of note, and failure of 
condition precedent were absolute in hold-
er's action upon promissory note, issued by 
promissor to realtor and sold to holder by 
agent of realtor, stating that note was due 
in full upon final closing between promis-
sor and buyers, which would be on or be-
fore certain date, when buyer* would exer-
cise their option to purchase motel, where 
sale of motel did not occur. U.C.C. 
§§ 3-104(1), 3-302(1); U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-
104. 
Michael R. Carlston, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Joseph H. Gallegos, Michael R. Sciumba-
to, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case involves a suit by plaintiff An-
gelo Calfo upon a promissory note issued 
by defendant D.C. Stewart Co. ("Stewart"). 
The note was payable to the order of CJ. 
Realty and was sold to Calfo by an agent 
of CJ. Realty. The trial court granted 
Calfo a summary judgment enforcing the 
note. Stewart appealed. We hold that the 
note was not a negotiable instrui ,ent and 
reverse the tria) court on that ground. 
Stewart owned the Astro Motel in Cedar 
City, Utah Defendant Roland Vance, a 
real estate ag«jnl for defendant CJ. Realty, 
approached Stewart about listing the motel 
for sale with CJ. Realty. The listing 
agreement was entered into, and Vance 
subsequently obtained a potential buyer for 
the motel. 
On September 24, 1979, Stewart and the 
potential buyer entered into a lease agree-
ment and option to purchase. The agree-
ment provided that the lessees could exer-
cise an option to purchase the motel on or 
before May 1, 1980. Also on September 24, 
1979, Stewart executed a promissory note 
for $15,900 payable to CJ. Realty to secure 
the real estate commission to which CJ. 
Realty would be entitled if the lessees exer-
cised their option to purchase. The promis-
sory note provided that it would be payable 
as follows: 
Total due in full upon final closing be-
tween D.C Stewart Co., Seller, and Wen-
dell James Downward and Connie Down-
ward, husband and wife, Buyers, which 
shall be on or before May 1, 1980, when 
Buyers exercise their option to purchase 
the Astro Motel in Cedar City, Utah. 
On September 27, 1979, the promissory 
note was sold by Vance, acting on behalf of 
CJ. Realtv, to the plaintiff Calfo for $12,. 
720. 
The lessees never exercised their option 
to purchase the Astro Motel. However, 
after May 1, 1980, Calfo made demand 
upon all of the defendants for payment of 
the note. Wfhen payment was not forth-
coming, suit was brought on the note 
against Stewart, and against Vance as 
guarantor of the note. Stewart then cross-
claimed against his co-defendants for in-
demnity. 
On January 5, 1982, the trial court heard 
Calfo's motion for summary judgment. 
Calfo argued that the promissory note was 
a negotiable instrument on its face, that it 
was past due, and that he was a holder in 
due course. On that same date, the court 
CALFO v. D.C 
Cfteas717P.2d 
also heard Stewart's motion for a summary 
judgment. Stewart asserted that the note 
was not a negotiable instrument and that 
Calfo was not a holder in due course. In 
addition, Stewart's counsel represented 
that if a judgment was granted against 
Stewart, counsel for Stewart's co-defend-
ants had consented to entry of judgment on 
Stewart's cross-claim for any amounts it 
was required to pay Calfo. The trial court 
orally granted Calfo's motion. In so doing, 
it found the note to be "a good note." The 
court denied Stewart's motion against Cal-
fo, but allowed Stewart indemnity against 
its co-defendants. 
[1] On January 14, 1982, the trial court 
executed a document entitled "Summary 
Judgment" which awarded Calfo the princi-
pal amouiit of the note $15,900, plus inter-
est at six percent per annum from the due 
date, and attorney fees of $2,700. Stewart 
first became aware of this document in 
May of 19S2, *hen Ca:fo attempted to col-
lect upon it by instituting supplemental 
proceedings. Stewart's counsel complained 
to Calfo's counsel that the form of judg-
ment had not been served upon him prior to 
its submission to the trial court, as re-
quired by Rule 2.9(b) of the District and 
Circuit Court Rules of Practice for the 
State of Utah. Efforts to have Calfo's 
counsel voluntarily withdraw the summary 
judgment failed. Stewart then moved the 
trial court to strike the judgment, arguing 
that the judgment improperly allowed in-
terest and that it had not been submitted to 
opposing counsel for approval prior to sub-
mission to the court. 
After a series of hearings on Stewart's 
motion to strike, the trial court executed an 
order on June 7, 1983, stating that "the 
lummary judgment entered by the court on 
January 14, 1982 . . . was properly signed 
and entered by the court on said date and 
* in full force and effect " However, 
the court's June 7th order did modify the 
1. Rule 73(a) was superseded on January 1, 1985, 
'by Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. All relevant developments in this case 
occurred under Rule 73(a), although the holding 
STEWART CO. Utah 699 
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earlier order by deleting the award of inter-
est. 
Stewart appeals from the order of June 
7, 1983. Calfo objects to the timeliness of 
the appeal, arguing that the June 7th order 
merely confirmed the judgment entered on 
January 14, 1982, albeit as redrawn to elim-
inate interest; therefore, the time to appeal 
expired one month after January 14, 1982, 
not one month after June 7, 1983. Rule 
73(a), Utah R.Civ.P.1 
The appeal was timely taken. We have 
previously held that unless Rule 2.9(b) of 
the District and Circuit Court Rules of 
Practice has been complied with, the judg-
ment in question is not deemed "filed" 
within the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the time 
for taking an appeal from that judgment 
under Rule 73(a) [now Rule 4(a) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure] does not be-
gin to run because the judgment has not 
been properly "entered." Bigelow v. In-
gersoll, Utah, 618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980); Lar-
sen v. Larsen, Utah, 674 P.2d 116, 117 
(1983); Wayne Garff Construction Co., 
Inc. v. Richards, Utah, 706 P.2d 1065, 1066 
(1985). Because Rule 2.9(b) was not com-
plied with here, there was no judgment 
from which an appeal could be taken until 
June 7, 1983. Stewart's appeal from the 
order entered on that date is timely. 
[2] Reaching the merits, Stewart ar-
gues that trial court erred in finding the 
promissory note to be a negotiable instru-
ment. To be negotiable under section 3-
104(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-3-104 (Repl.Vol. 7B, 
1980), an instrument must meet four crite-
ria. Specifically, it must (i) evidence a sig-
nature by the maker or drawer, (ii) contain 
an unconditional promise or order to pay a 
sum certain in money, (iii) be payable on 
demand or at a definite time, and (iv) be 
payable to order or to bearer. Stewart and 
Calfo agree that the promissory note in 
question satisfies the first and fourth of 
of this case with respect to when a judgment is 
"filed" is equally applicable under the new Rule 
4(a). 
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these requirements. They disagree as to 
whether second and third are met. 
[3] Although the second and third re-
quirements of negotiability are separately 
stated, in fact they are closely related. 
Both focus on whether the instrument is a 
clear and unconditional promise to pay. 
These concerns are central to the whole 
concept of negotiable instruments and that 
should be kept in mind in determining 
whether a document is entitled to be treat-
ed as a negotiable instrument under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Two important 
functions of negotiable instruments are "to 
supplement the supply of currency" and to 
provide a present representation of "future 
pa\ment of money." 1 W. Hawkland, A 
Tnnsaetinnal Guide to the Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2.0304, at 459 (1964). 
These currency and credit functions 
w iul'1 be defeated by conditional prom-
ises, because the cosily and time consum-
ing in\estimations that wouM V* required 
by such promises would imped' circula-
tion Conditional paper wouid increase 
the risks of the holder, and discount 
n.tes would be increased commenturate-
ly. Substitute? for money must be capa-
ble of rapid circulation at minimum risks, 
and credit documents are feasible only 
when low discounting prevails. Obvious-
ly, then, negotiable instruments must be 
unconditional to serve the purposes for 
which thty are created. 
Id. Because a negotiable instrument is a 
substitute for money or currency, both the 
promise to pay and the certainty of pay-
ment must be unequivocal. 
[4-6] For similar reasons, an instru-
ment's negotiability must be determinable 
from what appears on its face and without 
reference to extrinsic facts. See Partici-
pating Parts Associates, Inc. v. Pylant, 
Ala.Civ.App., 460 So.2d 1299, 1301 (1984); 
Holsonback v. First State Bank, Ala.Civ. 
App., 394 So.2d 381, 383 (1980), cert, de-
nied, Ala., 394 So.2d 384 (1981). See also 
Official Comments to U.C.C. § 3-105. 
This requirement protects transferees from 
latent defenses to payment, i.e., those de-
fenses which are not readily apparent from 
the document. 5 Anderson, Uniform Com, 
mercial Code § 3-104:4 (3d ed. 1984) (r^ j* 
ing upon First State Bank v. Clark, H 
N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144, 22 U.C.C. R J 
§ 1186 (1977)). On the other hand, i f ^ 
document evinces terms which should aWt 
the transferee of possible defenses, tW 
the transferee is not entitled to insulatioi 
from those apparent defenses. 
The whole purpose of the concept of t 
negotiable instrument under Article 3 » 
to declare that transferees in the ortfc. 
nary course of business are only to bt 
held liable for information appearing ^ 
the instrument itself and will not be ex-
pected to know of any limitations on r*. 
gotiability, or changes of terms, etc., COB-
tained in any separate documents. TV 
whole idea of the facilitation of eagv 
transfer of notes and instruments ^ 
quires thai a transferee be able to trust 
what the instrument says, and be able to 
determine the validity of the note and its 
negotiability from the language in the 
note itself. 
First State Bank v. Clark, 91 N.M. i n 
570 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1977). 
[7] The present case involves a promis-
son,' note which is "due in full upon final 
closing between . . . seller and . . . buyers 
which shall be on or before May 1, \ ^ 
when buyers exercise their option to pur. 
chase the Astro Motel.. . ." In determin. 
ing whether this promise to pay is condi-
tional or indefinite, we are not aided by the 
trial court's summary finding that this is & 
"good note." The document specifically 
states that it is due only upon final closing 
"when buyers exercise their option to pur. 
chase." This language clearly places the 
holder on notice that the note will become 
due only upon a contingency which the 
holder cannot control, i.e., the exercise bj 
buyers of their option to purchase. As foi 
definiteness, the date set forth, May l 
1980, merely defines when the option tc 
purchase expires and does not establish t 
time as to when the note will certainh 
become due. On these facts, we find th« 
note to be both conditional and indefinite 
on its face. 
IN RE DISCIPLINARY 
Cltea*717P.2d 
Calfo relies upon the case of Northwest-
m National Bank of Minneapolis v. 
huster, Minn, 307 N.W.2d 767 (1981), in 
ipport of his argument that language in 
ie promissory noie doe& not make the 
bligation to pay conditional. We find this 
npersuasive. In Shuster, the promissory 
o\e contained language that "[t]his is 
romised payment for ownership in Casper 
roject [v.-hen] option is exercised for 2nd 
alf." Id. at 770. The Shuster court 
)und that this reference to an option did 
ot create a conditional promise to pay. 
[owever, it ultimately held that the quoted 
iaguage prevented the holder from being 
"holder in due course" under section 3-
02(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code 
ecause it placed the holder on notice as to 
defense againn payment bated upon fail-
irt of a condition precedent if the option 
here was not exercised. Id. at 771 The 
iddings in Shuster— that the note is un-
onditionai but that it gave the holder no-
jee of defenses—appear to be inconsistent. 
He better reasoning would be that the 
iote was conditional and therefore non-ne-
Kttiable. See, e.g., Pa^iicipatiig Parts 
[&ociate$< Inc. v. Pylantx Ala., 460 Su.2d 
t299t 1301-02 a984V 
[S] For the reasons stated, we hold that 
fce promi^ ory note sued upon is not a 
jegotiable instrument and that judgment 
ras improperly entored against Stewart, 
ftere appears to be no dispute in the 
j^ cord that the sale of the Astro Motel did 
jot occur. Stewart's defenses of lack of 
•Dtisideration, non-maturity of the note, 
pid failure of condition precedent seen, to 
|g absolute. We therefore remand the 
gje for entry of a judgment in favor of 
gfoewart on its motion for summary judg-
ment, and for such further proceedings 
gainst the other defendants as are appro-
bate under the pleadings, and as are con-
titttot with this opinion. Consistent with 
Sole 33(a). Utah R.App.P., costs are award-
ad to appellant. 
HALL, C.J., and STtWAKT, HUWt, and 
pURHAM, JJ., concur. 
ACTION OF McCUNE 
701 (Ulah 1986) 
Utah 701 
In re DISCIPLINARY ACTION OF 
George McCUNE. 
No. 20140. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 31, 1986. 
Disciplinary proceeding wTas instituted. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J./held that 
counsel, who retained out-of-state attorney 
to represent client and engaged court re-
porter to transcribe depositions in a case, 
was subject tadisciplinary sanctions, includ-
ing reimbursement as condition to reinstate-
ment, for failure to pay tot the reporter's 
and other counsel's services, where those 
amounts were billpd to th^rclients, who paid 
counsel. 
Suspension oraered 
Howe, J., filed Wncurring statement, 
in which Zimmerman Y J., joined. 
1. Attorney and Client <f=)52 
Counsel's failure to\ answer formal 
complaint issued by ethicfe and discipline 
committee pan*! constitutes an admission 
of charges that he had failea to pay out-of-
state attorney whom he had engaged to 
represent client and certified court reporter 
which had been engaged to transcribe dep-
ositions in/one of counsel's case 
2. Attorney and Client <£=>36(1) 
Sup/erne Court's power to regulate 
practice of law necessarily includes the 
powerpx> discipline a lawyer. Const.Wt. 8, 
§§ 1 It seq., 4. 
3. Attorney and Client e»36(l) 
Legislature's power to regulate and 
control attorneys in certain aspects is sub-
ject to Supreme Court's inherent power 
discipline its officers. Const Art. 8, §§ 
PURCHASE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this L day 
of June, 1984, by, between and among SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIP, a Utah limited partnership (the "Seller"), AIR TERMINAL 
GIFTS, INC., a Utah corporation (the "Purchaser"), and GUMP & 
AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah corporation (the "General Part-
ner" ) ; 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Seller is a limited partnership formed 
under the laws of the State of Utah on September 2, 1983; and 
WHEREAS, Victor R. Ayers initially acted as general 
partner for the Seller, and as general partner had an 80% in-
terest in the Seller's capital, net profits, net losses and cash 
available for distribution, and as a limited partner, Victor R. 
Ayers had an additional 10% partnership interest, all of which 
interests have been assigned to the General Partner, and the 
General Partner acts as General fdrtnet fut Lin- Seller; anu 
WHEREAS, there are two additional limited partners, 
Wayne L. Morse, who has a 5% limited partnership interest in 
Seller and Michael A. Sass, who has a 5% limited partnership 
interest in seller? and 
WHEREAS, the Seller desires to sell and the Purchaser 
desires to acquire an interest in the Seller representing a 25% 
interest as a limited partner in the capital, net profits, net 
losses and cash available for distribution of the Seller for the 
purchase price of $200,000; and 
WHEREAS, in the interest of effecting an infusion of 
cash into the Seller, the General Partner agrees that the share 
of the Purchaser shall reduce the interest of the General Partner 
in the Seller, and shall have no effect on the interest of the 
other limited partners; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants, promises, representations and warranties contained herein, 
the parties hereto hereby agree as follows: 
1. Purchase and Sale of Partnership Interest. Subject 
to and upon the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the 
Seller hereby sells, conveys, assigns, transfers, and sets over 
unto the Purchaser and the Purchaser hereby accepts from the 
Seller an undivided limited partnership interest in the Seller, 
comprising a 25% interest in the capital, net profits, net losses 
and cash available for distribution or such other interest as the 
parties may agree to in writing, together with all of the rights 
of a limited partner under that certain Certificate and Agreement 
of Limited Partnership for Sunayers Limited Partnership dated 
September 2, 1983 and which otherwise are appurtenant to the 
status of limited partner under Utah law (the "Partnership 
Interest")• 
2. Price. The Purchase Price for the Partnership 
Interest shall be the sum of $200,000 (the "Purchase Price"), 
The Purchaser delivers to the Seller concurrently with the 
execution hereof cash, cashier's check(s) or certified funds 
representing the amount of $75,000, together with the Purchaser's 
promissory note in the amount of $125,000 in the^ form attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference 
(the "Promissory Note"), 
3. Documents Delivered Concurrently with the exe-
cution hereof, the Purchaser shall provide the Seller with (1) a 
UCC-1 form of Financing Statement for filing in the Lieutenant 
Governor's office of the State of Utah with respect to the 
security interest of the Seller in the Partnership Interest, and 
(2) the Promissory Note, duly executed by the Purchaser. 
4. Grant of Security Interest. The Purchaser hereby 
jrants to the Seller a Security Interest in and to the Partner-
ship Interest to secure the timely payment of all principal, 
Interest and other amounts due or to become due under the Promis-
sory Note. 
5. Term of Security Interest. This Agreement shall be 
:erminated only by the filing of a Termination Statement in 
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Uniform Com-
nercial Code as in effect in the State of Utah (the "Code"), 
tfhich shall be filed when the Promissory Note has been paid in 
full. Until ' terminated, the Security Interest hereby created 
shall continue in full force and effect and shall secure and be 
applicable to all amounts owing under the Promissory Note. 
6* Covenants. The Purchaser will do all acts and 
things, and will execute all writings requested by the Seller to 
establish, maintain and continue a perfected first security 
interest of the Seller in the Partnership Interest as a perfected 
and first security interest under the Code and will promptly on 
demand pay all costs and expense of filing and recording, inclu-
ding the costs of any searches deemed necessary by the Seller to 
establish and/or determine the validity and/or the priority of 
the Seller's security interest, and the Purchaser will pay all 
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taxes and other claims of charges which in the opinion of the 
Seller might prejudice, impair, or otherwise affect the Partner-
ship Interest. 
7
* Protection of Security. After 30 days written 
notice and demand upon the Purchaser, the Seller may make such 
payments and do such acts as the Seller may deem necessary to 
protect the Security Interest including, without limitation, 
paying, purchasing, contesting or compromising any encumbrance, 
charge or lien which is or may be prior to or superior to the 
security interest granted hereunder, and in exercising any such 
powers or authority to add all expenses incurred in connection 
therewith to the obligations secured hereby (it being understood 
and agreed that, after taking such action, the SPIIPT shall 
notify the Purchaser thereof in writing). 
8. Events of Default. The occurence of any of the 
following events shall constitute an event of default ("Event of 
Default") hereunder: 
a Any failure or neglect to comply with any 
of the terms, provisions, warranties, or covenants of 
this Agreement; or 
b. Any failure to pay any amount due under the 
Promissory Note when due, or such portions thereof as 
may be due, by acceleration or otherwise; or 
c. The falsehood of any warranty, representation 
or other information made, given or furnished to the 
Seller by or on behalf of the Purchaser with respect to 
the substance hereof, whether such warranty, represen-
tation or other information is false when made, given 
or furnished, or becomes false through the passage of 
time or the occurrence of any event subsequent hereto; 
or 
d. The issuance or filing of any attachment 
levy, garnishment, or other judicial process of or upon 
the Purchaser or the Partnership Interest; or 
e. Any sale or other disposition by the Purchaser 
in the ordinary course of business, or death, dissolu-
tion, termination of existence, insolvency, business 
failure, or assignment for the benefit of creditors of 
the Puchaser or commencement of any proceedings under 
any State or Federal bankruptcy or insolvency laws or 
laws for the release of debtors by the release of 
Purchaser, or the appointment of a receiver, trustee, 
• 3 -
court appointee, or otherwise for all or any part of 
the property of the Purchaser. 
9. Remedies. 
a. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default 
the Seller may, at it's discretion and without prior 
notice to the Purchaser in the event of failure to make 
any payments under the Promissory Note, or after 15 
days written notice as to any other Events of Default, 
declare all or any portion of the Promissory Note to be 
immediately due and payable, and shall have and exer-
cise any one or more of the rights and remedies given 
to a secured party under the Code, including without 
limitation the right to sell or otherwise dispose of 
any or all of the Partnership Interest, except that 
portion which bears the same proportion to the entire 
Partnership Interest as the portion of the Purchase 
Price paid by the Seller bears to the total Purchase 
Price, and to offset against the Promissory Note the 
amount owing by the Seller to the Purchaser. 
b. The proceeds of any sale or other disposition 
of the Partnership Interest authorized by this Agree-
ment shall be applied by the Seller first upon all 
expenses authorized by the Code and then upon all 
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred 
by the Seller; the balance of the proceeds of such sale 
or other disposition shall be applied in the payment of 
the Promissory Note, first to interest, then to prin-
cipal, and the surplus, if any, shall be paid over to 
the Purchaser or to such other persons as may be 
entitled thereto under applicable law. The purchaser 
shall remain liable for any deficiency which it shall 
pay to the Seller immediately upon demand. 
c. Seller may, upon the occurrence of any de-
fault, declare a forfeiture of all or any portion of 
the Partnership Interest except that portion which 
bears the same proportion to the entire Partner-
ship Interest as the portion of the Purchase Price paid 
by the Seller bears to the total Purchase Price, and 
reduce the interest of the Purchaser in the Seller to 
such extent for any and all purposes, in lieu of any 
other remedy hereunder. 
d. Nothing herein contained is intended, nor 
should it be construed to preclude the Seller from 
pursuing any other remedy provided by law for the 
collection of the Promissory Note or any portion 
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thereof, or for the recovery of any others from 
which the Seller may be or become entitled for the 
breach of this Agreement by the Purchaser. 
10. Distributions. In the event that at any time or 
from time to time after the date hereof, the Purchaser shall 
receive or shall become entitled to receive any distribution of 
any nature whatsoever, whether in property or any other assets, 
or the Purchaser shall receive or be entitled to receive securi-
ties, property or other assets in the case of any reorganization, 
consolidation, merger, or incorporation, then and in each such 
case, the Purchaser shall deliver to the Seller, and the Seller 
shall be entitled to receive and retain all such securities, 
property, or assets as an addition to the Partnership Interest as 
collateral for the payment oi the Promissory Note. 
11. Indemnification of Purchaser Against Liabilities 
of Seller. Except to the extent of Purchaser's investment in 
Seller, including that portion of the Purchase Price actually 
paid and any interest thereon actually paid pursuant to the 
Promissory Note and/or this Agreement, the Seller and the General 
Partner will indemnify and hold the Purchaser harmless from and 
against any and all losses, claims, damages, expenses or liabil-
ities joint or several, to which the Purchaser may become sub-
ject, and, except as hereinafter provided, will reimburse trie 
Purchaser for any legal or other expenses reasonably incurred by 
it in connection with investigating or defending any actions 
whether or not resulting in any liability, insofar as such 
losses, claims, damages, expenses, liabilities, or actions arise 
out of or are based upon any contracts, transactions, agreements, 
representations, statements, promises, warranties, negotiations, 
undertakings, activities, services, expenditures, performances, 
benefits, or other dealings of any nature whatsoever, made by or 
on behalf of the Purchaser in its capacity as a limited partner 
of the Seller, or which are or may become incumbent upon the 
Purchaser by virtue of its position as a limited partner of the 
Seller, and for which the Purchaser is held liable as a general 
partner of the Seller or as a general partner with the General 
Partner on the basis of this Agreement, except any such losses, 
claims, damages, expenses, liabilities, or actions caused by 
specific acts or ommissions of the Purchaser (other than entering 
into this Agreement); provided, however, that the indemnity 
Agreement contained in this Section shall not apply to amounts 
paid in settlement of any such litigation if such settlements are 
effected without the consent of the General Partner and the 
Seller. This Indemnity Agreement is in addition to any other 
liability which the Seller and the General Partner may otherwise 
have to the Purchaser. The Purchaser agrees that within thirty 
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days after receipt by it of written notice of the commencement of 
any action against it, in respect of which indemnity may be 
sought from the Seller and the General Partner on account of this 
Indemnity Agreement, to notify the Seller and the General Partner 
in writing of the commencment thereof. The ommission of the 
Purchaser so to notify the Seller or the General Partner of any 
such action shall relieve the Seller and the General Partner from 
any liability which they may have to the Purchaser on account of 
the indemnity Agreement contained in this Section, but only if 
and to the extent that such person did not otherwise have knowl-
edge of the commencement of the action and such persons ability 
to defend against the action were prejudiced such failure; 
provided, however, that no failure to give notice shall relieve 
such person from any other liability which he may have to the 
Purchaser. 
12. Indemnity Against Claims of Morse and of the 
Shepherds. Except to the extent of Purchaser's investment in 
Seller, including that portion of the Purchase Price actually 
paid and any interest thereon actually paid pursuant to the 
Promissory Note and/or this Agreement, the Seller and the General 
Partner will indemnify and hold the Purchaser harmless from and 
against any reduction in the proportionate share of capital, net 
income, net loss or cash available for distribution to which the 
Partnership Interest entitles the Purchaser, and, except as 
hereinafter provided, will reimburse the Purchaser fcr the 
reduction of the Purchaser's portion of any distribution insofar 
as such reduction arises out of or is bas^d upon any claims 
against the Partnership or its property made by Richard and/or 
Judy Shepherd of Salt Lake City, Utah or Wayne L. Morse of 
Kaysville, Utah. This Indemnity Agreement is in addition to any 
other liability which the Seller and the General Partner may 
otherwise have to the Purchaser. 
13. Admission into Partnership. It is the intention 
of the parties hereto that the Purchaser shall be admitted as a 
limited partner of the Seller, but that the investment in the 
Seller of the Purchase Price and the grant to the Purchaser of a 
25% interest in the net profits, net losses and cash available 
for distribution shall be effective even though the admission of 
the Purchaser as a limited partner of Seller is, for some 
reason, not effective. In this connection, the Seller and 
the General Partner shall use their best efforts to cause a new 
and appropriate amendment to the Certificate of Limited Partner-
ship to be issued and to be filed. It is recognized by all 
parties that Victor R. Ayers was Seller's original general 
partner, and not all of Seller's limited partners have as of the 
date hereof consented to the substitution of the General Partner 
for Victor R. Ayers as general partner for the Seller, and that 
it may not be possible to obtain an amendment to the Certificate 
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of Partnership and/or written consent to admit the Purchaser as a 
limited partner in the Seller. Prior to and until the Purchaser 
is admitted to Seller as a limited partner, this Agreement shall 
be effective to convey to the Purchaser a 25% interest in the 
capital, net profits, net losses and Cash Available for Distri-
bution which would otherwise inure to the benefit of the General 
Partner, except and to the extent some portion of the Partnership 
Interest is forfeited or resold pursuant to Section 9, above, and 
also to grant to the Seller a security interest in such 25% 
interest. 
14. Power of Attorney. The General Partner shall be, 
and hereby is, appointed the true and lawful attorney-in-fact for 
the Purchaser as a Limited Partner in the Seller, with full power 
and authority for the Purchaser and in the name of the Purchaser, 
to make, execute, acknowledge, publish, file and swear to in the 
execution, acknowledgement, filing and recording of: 
(a) Any amendment to the Certificate and Agree-
ment of Limited Partnership necessary to effect the 
admission of the Purchaser as a limited partner in the 
Seller or the General Partner as the General Partner of 
the Seller, and any separate Certificate of Limited 
Partnership, as well as amendments thereto, as required 
under the laws or the State of Utah or any other state 
in which such instrument is rquired to be filed. 
(b) Any certificates, instruments and documents 
including Ficticious Name Certificates, which may be 
required by, or may be appropriate under, the laws of 
the State of Utah or any other state or jurisdication 
in which the Partnership is doing or intends to do 
business. 
(c) Any other instrument which may be required to 
be filed by the Partnership under the laws of the State 
of Utah or any other state or by any governmental 
agency, or which the General Partner deems it advisable 
to file, and 
(d) Any documents which may be required to effect 
the continuation of the Partnership or admission of any 
additional or substituted Limited Partner, or the 
dissolution of the Partnership. 
The foregoing grant of authority: 
(a) Is a Special Power of Attorney coupled with 
an interest, is irrevocable, and shall survive the 
dissolution of the Purchaser; 
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(b) May be exercised by the General Partner by 
executing an instrument under signature of one or more 
of its trustees or other authorized officers as at-
torney-in-fact for the Undersigned whose name shall be 
listed in the respective instruments as a Limited 
Partner, assignee or assignor, as the case may be; 
and 
(c) Shall survive the delivery of an assignment 
by the Purchaser of all or any part of the Partnership 
Interest; except that where the assignee thereof has 
been approved by the General Partner for admission to 
the Seller as a substituted limited partner, this power 
of attorney shall survive the delivery of such assign-
ment for the sole purpose of enabling the General 
Partner to execute, acknowledge and file any instrument 
necessary to effect such substitution. 
The Purchaser hereby agrees to be bound by all of the 
representations of the General Partner as his attorney-in-fact 
for the Purchaser and waives any and all defenses which may be 
available to the Purchaser to contest, negate, or disaffirm the 
actions of the General Partner or other successors under this 
power of attorney, and hereby ratifies and confirms all acts 
which said attorney-in-fact may take as attorney-in-fact Here-
under in all respects as though performed by the Purchaser. 
15. Representations and Warranties of the Purchaser. 
The Purchaser hereby represents and warrants to the Seller as 
follows: 
(a) The Partnership Interest is being purchased by 
the Purchaser for investment only, for the Purchaser's 
own account, and not with a view to, or in connection 
with, the distribution thereof, and the Purchaser is 
not participating, directly or indirectly, in an 
underwriting of all or any portion of the Partnership 
Interest. 
(b) The Purchaser will not take, or cause to be 
taken, any action that would cause the Underwriter to 
be deemed an "underwriter" of the Partnership Interest, 
as the term "underwriter" is defined in Section 2(11) 
of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Act"). 
(c) The Purchaser has received and the Purchaser 
or its duly authorized representative has read and 
hereby specifically accepts and adopts each and every 
provision of the form of the Certificate and Agreement 
of Limited Partnership of the Seller. 
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(d) The Purchaser (and the Purchaser's repre-
sentative, if any) has had an opportunity to ask 
questions of, and receive answers from, persons acting 
on behalf of the General Partner regarding the opera-
tions and financial condition of the Seller, and has 
received all such information it has requested, such 
information being furnished solely by Victor R. Ayers, 
an officer of the General Partner. 
(e) By reason of the Purchaser's knowledge and 
experience in financial and business matters in 
general, and investments in particular, the Purchaser 
is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of an 
investment by the Purchaser in the Partnership In-
terest • 
(f) The Purchaser is capable of bearing the 
economic risks of an investment in the Partnership 
Interest. 
(g) The Purchaser's financial condition is such 
that the Purchaser is under no present or contemplated 
future need to dispose of any portion of the Partner-
ship Interest to satisfy any existing or contemplated 
undertaking, need, or indeDtedness. 
16. Representations and Warranties of Seller, The 
Seller hereby represents and warrants to the Purchaser that 
the Seller and the General Partner have disclosed to Purchaser 
all relevant information regarding the financial condition of the 
Seller and the General Partner and all relevant data and account-
ing information regarding the Sunflower project in St. George, 
Washington County, Utah, the principal asset of Seller. 
17. Transfer Restrictions. The Purchaser recognizes 
that the purchase of the Partnership Interest involves a high 
degree of risk. The Purchaser also acknowledges that there is no 
public market for the Partnership Interest and that in all 
likelihood a public market for the Partnership Interest will not 
exist at any time in the future and that, therefore, the Pur-
chaser may not be able to liquidate an investment in the Partner-
ship Interest should the Purchaser desire to do so. It is also 
acknowledged that transferability is limited, and in the event of 
a disposition, the Purchaser could sustain a loss. It is ack-
nowledged that the Purchaser or the Purchaser's investment 
representative has been given access to the same kind of infor-
mation as would be furnished in a Registration Statement under 
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or has access to such 
information and, in addition, has access to such additional 
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information as deemed necessary to verify the accuracy of all 
information. The Purchaser acknowledges further that the Part-
nership Interest was acquired in a negotiated transaction with 
the General Partner, or its representatives. As to limitations 
on disposition of the Partnership Interest, the Purchaser recog-
nizes that the Partnership Interest has not been registered under 
the Actf and that restrictions on transferability apply as 
referred to herein, which restrictions on transferability will be 
noted upon such certificates as may evidence the ownership of the 
Partnership Interest and, further, such restrictions on transfer-
ability will be noted in the appropriate records of the Seller. 
The Partnership Interest, or any portion thereof shall 
be sold, pledged, assigned, hypothecated, or otherwise trans-
ferred, with or without consideration, (a "Transfer") only upon 
the conditions specified in this Section 15. The Undersigned 
realizes that by becoming a holder of the Partnership Interest, 
the Purchaser agrees, prior to any Transfer, to give written 
notice to the Seller expressing the desire of the undersigned to 
effect the Transfer and describing the proposed Transfer. 
Upon receiving any such notice, the Seller shall 
present copies thereof to counsel for the Seller and the fol-
lowing provisions shall apply: 
(a) If, in the opinion of such counsel, the 
proposed Transfer may be effected without registration 
thereof under the Act, and applicable state securities 
law (the "State Acts"), the Seller shall promptly 
thereafter notify the holder of the Partnership In-
terest, whereupon such holder shall be entitled to 
effect the Transfer, all in accordance with the terms 
of the notice delivered by such holder to the Seller 
and upon such further terms and conditions as shall be 
required by the Seller in order to assure compliance 
with the Act and the State Acts. 
(b) If, such counsel is unable to opine that the 
Transfer may be effected without registration under the 
Act and/or the State Acts, the Transfer shall not be 
made unless registration of the Transfer is then in 
effect. 
The Purchaser realizes that the Partnership Interest is 
not, and will not be, registered under the Act, and that the 
Seller does not file and does not intend to file periodic reports 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the 
reouirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, as amended. The Purchaser also understands that the 
Partnership has not agreed to register the Partnership Interest 
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for distribution in accordance with the provisions of the Act or 
the State Acts, and that the Company has not agreed to comply 
with any exemption under the Act or the State Acts for the resale 
of the Partnership Interest. For example, the Seller has not 
agreed to supply such information as would be required to enable 
routine sales of the Partnership Interest to be made under the 
provisions of certain rules respecting "restricted securities" 
promulgated under the Act. The Purchaser acknowledges that the 
Partnership Interest which the Purchaser purchased pursuant 
hereto must be held indefinitely, unless and until subsequently 
registered under the Act and/or the State Acts or unless an 
exemption from such registration is available, in which case the 
undersigned may still be limited as to the amount of the Partner-
ship Interest which may be sold. 
18. General Provisions. The following provisions are 
a part of this Agreement: 
(a) Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes 
the entire understanding and agreement between the 
parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements, 
representations or understandings between the parties 
relating to the subject matter hereof* 
(b) Binuinvj A<jietftu<ruL. This A^Letsment shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the 
heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, 
as applicable, of the respective parties hereto, and 
any entities resulting from the reorganization, consol-
idation or merger of any party hereto. 
(c) Headings. The headings used in this Agree-
ment are inserted for reference purposes only and shall 
not be deemed to limit or affect in any way the meaning 
or interpretation of any of the terms or provisions of 
this Agreement. 
(d) Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed 
upon any number of counterparts with the same effect as 
if the signature to any counterpart were upon the same 
instrument. 
(e) Severability. The provisions of this Agree-
ment are severable, and should any provision hereof be 
found to be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void, 
voidable or unenforceable provision shaJl not affect 
any other portion or provision of this Agreement. 
(f) Waiver. Any waiver by any party hereto of 
anv breach of any kind or character whatsoever by any 
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other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied, 
shall not be construed as a continuing waiver of or 
consent to any subsequent breach of this Agreement on 
the part of the other party. 
(g) Modif icat ion. This Agreement may not be 
modified except by an instrument in writing signed by 
the parties hereto. 
(h) Governing Law. This Agreement shall be 
interpreted, construed and enforced according to the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
(i) Attorney's Fees. In the event any action or 
proceeding is brought by either party against the other 
under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs in such 
amount as the Court may adjudge reasonable. 
(j) Time of the Essence. The parties hereby 
agree that time is of the essence. 
(k) Notices. All notices required or permitted 
to be given hereunder shall be duly given if hand 
delivered or maiieo oy certified mail, p^^'La^^ pLc^aiu, 
to the following addresses, or to such other addresses 
as may be hereafter specified in writing: 
If to the Seller, to: 
Sunayers Limited Partnership 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
With a copy to: 
Charles R. Brown, Esq. 
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
If to the Purchaser, to: 
Air Terminal Gifts, Inc. 
AMF Box 22031 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122 
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If to the General Partner, to: 
Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc, 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
With a copy to: 
Charles R. Brown, Esq. 
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(1) Survival of Representations. The represen-
tations and covenants and agreements of the parties set 
forth herein shall survive the execution hereof and 
continue to be enforceable by the parties in any suit 
or cause of action at law or in equity. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
Aqreement effective as of the date first set forth above. 
SELLER: 
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
a Utah limited partnership 
By: GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
B y : £ • - * • • ;•'<•• • * * * -
«* — , _ Y 
Its: ; V -' J, / 
BUYER: 
AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation 
c • / " - ' . . ' - - / ' " / Byy&.rr//». '/ (-'>-•--, sr; 
* I t s : ;• • • „ 
GENERAL PARTNER: 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
By: C^2.. i-V Q~/-t>^ 
Its: .;-; ,-" / / 
' / 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
$125,000.00 June S~ , 1984 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay, 
in lawful money of the United States of America, to the Order of 
SUNAYERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the principal sum of One Hundred 
Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) together with interest 
on the unpaid balance at a variable rate which shall be calcu-
lated by adding One Percent (1%) per annum to the prime lending 
rate charged by First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., to its highest 
rated commercial * customers, as adjusted from time to time (the 
"Prime Rate")The said principal and interest shall be paid by the 
undersigned at 2120 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84106, or at such other place as the holder hereof may designate 
in writing. The principal payable pursuant to this Note shall be 
paid in three (3) installments in the amounts and on the dates 
set forth as follows, together with any and all interest accrued 
on the remaining unpaid principal balance as of the date of each 
respective principal payment. 
Principal Date Due 
$ 41,666.67 December 1, 1984 
$ 41,666.67 June 1, 1985 
$ 41,666.66 December 1, 1985 
All payments shall be applied first to the payment of 
interest then to the reduction of the unpaid principal balance. 
The Prime Rate may change from time to time and the 
interest payable on this Note shall continue to fluctuate at the 
same increment above the Prime Rate. Any changes in the interest 
rate hereunder shall become effective without prior notice on the 
date the Prime Rate changes. 
This Note may be prepaid at any time, and from time 
to time, before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty or 
premium. All amounts paid shall be credited first to interest 
and then to a reduction of the outstanding principal balance. 
If any payment of principal and/or interest required 
hereunder is not made within fifteen (15) days after the date 
such payment is due, or if any other event occurs or circum-
stances exist which under any instrument evidencing or securing 
the obligations evidenced hereby entitles the holder hereof to 
and accrued 
option 
without notice, 
constitute a waiver of 
subsequent time. 
accelerate the maturity of such obligations, the entire sum of 
principal interest remaining unpaid shall, at the 
of the holder hereof, become immediately due and payable 
Failure to exercise this option shall not 
the right to exercise tha same at any 
This Note, or any payment hereunder, may be extended 
from time to time without in any way affecting or impairing the 
liability of the maker or endorsers hereof. 
The maker, endorsers and guarantors hereof severally 
waive diligence, presentment for payment, demand, protest, notice 
thereof, and consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
State of Utah and to the extension of time of payment of this 
Note without notice, and hereby agree to pay all costs, fees and 
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this Note, or in pursuing any remedy 
provided Dy tne laws of tne State of Utah, whether such remedy 
is pursued by filing a suit in equity or an action at law or 
otherwise. 
This Note is secured by that certain Purchase and 
Security Agreement dated June , 1984. Reference is made to 
the Purchase and Security Agreement for additional rights of the 
holder hereof. 
PURCHASER: 
AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC. 
By: 
T t s 
Sunayers hereby assigns, with recourse, all of its right title 
and interest in the above promissory note and the agreement 
securing it to First Federal Savings and Loan Assn. of Salt 
Lake Citv, 
Sunayers Limited Partnership 
By Gump and Avers 
Real Fstate Inc. 
Its General Partner 
Victor R, Avers, President 
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FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
of Salt Lake City 
June 13, 1985 Loan No. 17000100-5 
S85,221.31 Interest: 13.0% 
ON DEMAND or 180 days after date, for value received, I, we, or 
ther of us, promise to pay to the order of FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
IN ASSOCIATION at its office at 505 East Second South, Salt Lake City, 
ih, the sum of EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY ONE & 31/100s 
liars in lawful money of the United States of America with interest 
ereon, at the rate of 13.0% percent per annum, (interest computed on 
e basis of 365 day year and actual days elapsed). Payable at maturity 
om date of note until maturity, and thereafter at the rate of 13.0% 
rcent per annum until paid. If the holder deems itself insecure of it 
fault be made in paymer.t of the whole or any part of any installment at 
e time when the place where the same becomes due and payble as aforesaid 
en the entire unpaid balance, with interest as aforesaid, shall at the 
ection of the holder hereof and without notice of said election at once 
•come due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration, 
>e undersigned, jointly and severally agree to pay the holder hereof 
>asonable attorney's fees, legal exprenses and lawful collectio costs in 
Idition to all other sums due hereunder. 
Tne indebtedness evidenced by this Note is secured by a Promissory 
Dte dated June 5, 1984, and a Security Agreement of even date. 
GUMP and AYERS REAL ESTATE INC. 
UE ON DEMAND: Dgcpmbpr 10 1QR5 
Victor R. Avers /President 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake Citv. VT R41Off 
MONIES NEEDED FOR SUNFLOWER 
As of June 25, 1934 
j_~EKSD'JE TC MORSE SHORTFALL 
L y n ^ e Bro thers I n t e r i m 
•* : 1 k ir-s; n [ ; ec t r i e 
G'jr:j * Av 
a»vj be. 
" U L t o t a l 
:0NAL *~:"± 
zAnzr. WcV on East Sice 
( 5 5 , i O r cs : t f i U n c c Ju ly IE) 
JcC:> Sr-;tu ; , A r c h i t e c t 
Gco rce Siane* i 
k'i 1 k inscn El metr ic 
Kichce'i Sass 
Carpor t Ce'.trs ( a l l 60} 
Ai rc ' iane k e r t e l 
Subto ta l 
S 22,400.00 
9,510.00 
1,200.00 
ihOOCCO 
ie,iiOo.co 
S 14,332.00 
2,000.00 
2,600.00 
2.700.00 
10,000.00 
6,294.00 
4^00.00 
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falmateer v. International Harvester 
85 IU.App.3d 50, 53, 40 Ill.Dec. 58fl 
592, 406 N.E.2d 595, 598 (3 Dist.l98fl), 
re\d in part on other grounds, 85 Ilu2d 
124\ 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); 
Stoecklein v. Illinois Tool Works, /nc/589 
F.Suto. 139, 145-46 (N.D.I11.1984). 
In relevant part, Count III statei only 
that the "defendant terminated plaintiff 
based on the claim that 'he did not fit the 
image oft a Reader's Digest salesperson,' 
despite his exemplary sales record and in 
contravention of its policy for involuntary 
termination^" As a result, plaintiff claims 
to have manifested signs of emotional dis-
tress in the v>rm of severe depression and 
insomnia. 
Plaintiff hak failed proj^rly to allege 
three of the four elements 6f the tort. He 
has not allegedUhat the defendant either 
intended to cau$e emotipnal distress, or 
that the defendant acted with such reckless 
disregard that it $houlo have known that 
severe emotional distress was substantially 
certain to result Plamtiff has not alleged 
any extreme or outrageous conduct by de-
fendant. He has meiely alleged that the 
defendant fired him without just cause, 
allegedly in violation of an employment 
contract. Such conduct\is not extreme or 
outrageous. Nor/are such allegations suf-
ficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 
See, e.g., Stoeckflein, 589 RSupp. at 146 & 
n. 9; Pudil, 607 F.Supp. aft 444 and cases 
cited therein. yFinally, plaintiff alleges only 
that he suffered severe emotional distress 
(and insomma). "Severe emotional dis-
tress" is a conclusion of law wftich must be 
supported my factual allegations in the 
complaint./ Stoecklein, 589 F.Subp. at 146, 
n. 9. Plaintiff did allege proximate cause. 
Plaintiff/argues that, though the aurcten is 
high, his complaint is sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim. If the only problem with this 
claim/ were the lack of factual allegations 
on tie severity of his emotional distress, 
we inight be inclined to agree. However, 
thy complete lack of an allegation of out-
g;eous conduct, and the apparent imposki-
(flity of making such an allegation giver 
he facts which are alleged, lead us inevita\ 
t^o dismiss Count III for failure to st 
a claihvs^pon which relief can be jprtfnied. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons^t^fed above, defend-
ant's motion todfemissibi^ailure to state 
a claim i^ffanted as to Cottut III, and 
d e n i ^ i s to Count I. Count II n£&4>een 
fidrawn by the plaintiff. 
| 0 | KEYMUMBEft SYSTEM > 
SUNDSVALLSBANKEN, Plaintiff, 
FONDMETAL, INC. and Robern 
International, Inc., Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
No. 85 Civ. 1453 (RWS). 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Nov. 27, 1985. 
Payee brought action to collect on a 
renewal promissory note. On payee's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment, and 
maker's cross motions for sanctions for 
payee's refusal to submit to discovery, the 
District Court, Sweet, J., held that: (1) 
alleged conversion of accounts receivable 
securing maker's obligations under note 
did not preclude payee from collecting note; 
(2) fact that payee allegedly breached its 
alleged duty to indemnify maker's principal 
against certain claims bearing no relation-
ship to maker's obligations under note did 
not preclude payee's collection of note; (3) 
payee was a holder in due course; and (4) 
sanctions for payee's failure to respond 
expeditiously to discovery requests were 
not warranted. 
Judgment in accordance with opinion. 
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1. Federal Civil Procedure G=»2544 
If opponent to summary judgment mo-
tion iafls to aflege that there are substan-
tial facts in dispute, his reliance on unsub-
stantiated denial of accuracy of movant's 
affidavits is insufficient to controvert a mo-
tion for summary judgment. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <^2553 
Rule 56(f) requires district court to in-
sure that parties have reasonable opportu-
nity to make their record complete before 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>2553 
Rule 56(f), requiring district court to 
insure that parties have reasonable oppor-
tunity to make their record complete before 
ruling on motion for summary judgment, is 
not a shield against all summary judgment 
motions; litigants seeking relief under 
Rule 56(f) must show that material sought 
is germane to claim or defense and is nei-
ther cumulative nor speculative. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Bills and Notes <$=>452(1) 
Alleged conversion of accounts receiva-
ble securing maker's obligations under re-
newal promissory note did not preclude 
payee from collecting on that note, in that 
security agreement did not pertain to any 
specific accounts receivable, payee had no 
duty to protect those receivables, and 
payee was not aware of the alleged conver-
sion. 
5. Bills and Notes *»452(1) 
Fact that payee allegedly breached its 
alleged duty to indemnify maker's principal 
against certain claims bearing no relation-
ship to maker's obligations under renewal 
promissory note did not preclude payee's 
collection of note. 
€. Bills and Notes *»353 
Renewal promissory note was sup-
ported by independent consideration and, 
thus, was taken "for value" so as to make 
payee a holder in due course, where payee 
liberalized payment schedule on remainder 
of funds due on previous promissory note 
from maker and declined to place maker 
default on payments under previous noi 
\3.CX. § * • » » . 
See publication Words and Phrase* 
for other judicial constructions anc 
definitions. 
7. Bills and Notes e=>337 
Under U.C.C. § 3-302, defining 
"holder in due course," it does not matter, 
for purposes of "good faith" whether rea 
sonable person would have known thai 
something in transaction was amiss, but 
merely that holder did not know that trans-
action was suspect. 
8. Bills and Notes $=»332 
For purposes of holder in due course 
status notice of defenses against an instru-
ment means actual subjective knowledge ol 
defenses, and not mere existence of suspi-
cious circumstances. U.C.C. § 3-302. 
9. Bills and Notes <&=>336 
Ffcst tt\?>l rn&tat's pYYfc^ Y&l sAtefe^ dfy 
notified payee that principal had suspicions 
that third party was converting accounts 
receivable securing maker's obligations un-
der renewal promissory note did not mean 
that payee took note in bad faith and, thus, 
was not a holder in due course, in that 
principal did not assert such alleged con-
version as excuse for nonpayment of note, 
and note had been executed as result oi 
payee's willingness to renegotiate prior 
promissory note at behest of maker 
U.C.C. § 3-302. 
10. Bills and Notes e»337 
For purposes of holder in due course 
status, promissory note is not taken in bad 
faith if payee has agreed to renegotiate I 
prior promissory note rather than place 
maker in default. U.C.C. § 3-302. 
11. Bills and Notes *»332 
Fact that maker's principal allegedlj 
notified payee that he had suspicions thai 
accounts receivable securing maker's obli 
gations under renewal promissory note 
were being converted by third party did nol 
constitute notice of a defense to the note s( 
as to preclude payee's status as a holder u 
due course, and, thus, to preclude collectior 
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U.C.C. §§ 3-302(l)(c), 3- Rathaus, Lofberg, SVB and to a fctwr 
Skandinaviska Enskflda Banken 
of the note. 
304(l)(b). 
12. Federal Civil Procedure $=>1278 
Sanctions for plaintiffs failure to re-
spond expeditiously to defendant's dis-
covery requests were not warranted, where 
defendant failed to show that it lacked any 
relevant information within plaintiffs con-
trol for purposes of responding to plain-
tiffs summary judgment motion. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc'.Rules 37, 56(f), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Carey & Deinoff, New York City, for 
plaintiff; Michael Q. Carey, of counsel. 
Lerich & Lerich, New York City, for 
defendants and third-party plaintiffs; Hy-
man D. Lerich, Eric Moss, of counsel. 
OPINION 
SWEET, District Judge. 
Plaintiff Sundsvallsbanken ("SVB") 
brings this motion for partial summary 
judgment under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., to 
collect on a renewal promissory note exe-
cuted by defendants Fondmetal, Inc. and 
Robern International, Inc. (collectively 
"Fondmetal/USA") in favor of SVB. 
Fondmetal/USA opposes the motion for 
partial summary judgment claiming that it 
is entitled to pursue additional discovery 
under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and cross-motions for an 
order pursuant to Rule 37(d) imposing sanc-
tions against SVB for refusal to submit to 
discovery in this action. For the reasons 
set forth below, SVB's motion for partial 
summary judgment on the note is granted, 
and Fondmetal/USA's motion for sanctions 
is denied. 
Facts 
The following facts are undisputed ex-
cept as noted. 
This action arises from the division of the 
business affairs of defendants and their 
principal Bernt C. Rathaus ("Rathaus") 
from those of Fondmetall/AB, a Swedish 
company, and its principal Anders J. Lof-
berg ("Lofberg"). In order to terminate 
and dissolve their joint venture in 1984, 
extent oNauum»»«»» * 
("SEB") entered into a comnk* senes 01 
agreements. On June 7.19S4 Rathaus sold 
Lofberg all the shares of common stock 
which Rathaus owned in Fondmetail/AB, 
the Swedish company. On the same day, 
Lofberg and Rathaus agreed that Fondme-
tal/USA owed Fondmetail/AB »l.«",-
000.00 and entered into a Settlement and 
Security agreement ("Settlement Agree-
ment"). The agreement P W n d e d „ ^ 
Fondmetal/USA would pay Fondmetall/AB 
$1,400,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory 
note ("Note A") which was simultaneously 
executed and delivered w:th a»e agreement 
and as part consideration for the redirec-
tion of the amount which Fondmetall/AB 
claimed it was owed. Fondnwull. AB re-
ceived a security interest in and hen upon 
all of Fondmetal/USA's accounts and chat-
tel papers. The Settlement Agreement 
also provided that Fondmetall/AB could as-
sign its rights under the agreement, and all 
the rights and obligations under the agree-
ment would inure to the benefit of and be 
binding upon the assignee. Also on June 7, 
1984, the parties executed two Limited Re-
lease and Indemnification Agreements ( In-
demnification Agreements"). 
In the first indemnification, Fondme-
tall/AB and Lofberg released Fondme-
tal/USA and Rathaus from certain obli-
gations and claims, and in turn they agreed 
to indemnify Fondmetall/AB and Lofberg 
from acts of Rathaus, the companies or 
officers up to June 7, 1984. In the second 
indemnification agreement, Fondme-
tal/USA and Rathaus released Lofberg and 
Fondmetall/AB from certain obligations 
and in return Lofberg and Fondmetell/AB 
agreed to indemnify Fondmetal/USA and 
Rathaus with respect to activities of the 
Swedish company or its officers up to June 
7,1984. 
Finally, on June 7,1984, Fondmetall/AB 
assigned Note A to SVB, a note which was 
to "be paid in four installments beginnmi 
August 1, 1984, ending July 1, W85 
Simultaneously, Fondmetall/AB also as 
signed its rights under the Settlemen 
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Agreement to SVB. Each assignment was 
agreed to by Fondmetal/USA, and each 
assignment provided a conditional indemni-
fication agreement for the benefit of 
Fondmetal/USA which by its terms indem-
nified the companies against any claim 
which SEB might make against them in 
relation to the Fondmetall/AB default: 
. . . in the performance of a loan granted 
by [SEB] to [FONDMETALL] in the 
principal amount of U.S. $290,000. The 
agreement by [SVB] to hold [FONDME-
TAL/USA] harmless shall not include 
any other claim which [SEB] may have 
against [FONDMETAL/USA] for any 
other reason whatsoever. 
The agreement by [SVB] to hold 
[FONDMETAL/USA] harmless as set 
out above shall not entitle them to a 
setoff against or in any way limit the 
[Fondmetal/USA] obligations under the 
Promissory Note or the Assignment to 
[SVB] by [Fondmetal]] of all its rights 
under said Promissory Note .. . ," 
Neither assignment provides for personal 
indemnification of Rathaus. (Exh. D, Ra-
thaus Affidavit of 7/7/85 Doc. * 1 & 2). 
After the completion of these agree-
ments, Fondmetal/USA began making pay-
ments to SVB under Note A.1 However, in 
October of 1984, Rathaus informed SVB 
that he would be unable to meet the pay-
ment schedule under Note A, and on Octo-
ber 31, 1984 the parties entered into an 
amended Settlement Agreement and a re-
newed promissory note ("Note B"). Sim-
ilar events resulted in another amended 
Settlement Agreement and renewed prom-
issory note ("Note C") on January 24, 1985. 
The amount of Note C was $450,000.00, 
Fondmetal/USA having paid $950,000.00 
pursuant to Notes A and B. These amend-
ments altered the payment schedules for 
the indebtedness to Fondmetal/USA's ben-
efit, but provided for the immediate accrual 
1. The parties are in dispute over what reasons 
were given for the inability to meet the Note A 
payment schedule. While Rathaus and SVB 
agree that Rathaus mentioned that he suspected 
Lofberg of unlawfully converting accounts re-
ceivable of Fondmetal/USA, Rathaus claims 
that he offered this conversion as the reason 
of interest on all principal amounts out-
standing under the renewal notes. 
Fondmetal made no payment on Note C, 
and SVB commenced this suit to recover 
the monies due. 
Discussion 
All doubts must be resolved and all rea-
sonable inferences must be drawn in favor 
of the party opposing the motion. United 
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 
82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per 
curiam); United States v. One Tintoretto 
Painting Entitled "The Holy Family with 
Saint Catherine and Honored Donor", 
691 F.2d 603, 606 (2d Cir.1982). This Cir-
cuit has long endorsed a policy of allowing 
the development of a full factual record 
through trial of the issues presented, a 
policy which is limited by the grant of 
summary judgment. See Jaroslawicz v. 
Seedman, 528 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir.1975). 
[1] The burden faced by the moving 
party should not, however, be made so 
insurmountable as to vitiate summary 
judgment relief. If the opponent to the 
summary judgment motion fails to allege 
that there are substantial facts in dispute, 
his reliance on an unsubstantiated denial of 
the accuracy of the movant's affidavits is 
insufficient to controvert a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Project Release v. Prov-
ost, 722 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir.1983); see 
WIXT Television, Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 
506 F.Supp. 1003 (N.D.N.Y.1980). 
[2,3] Fondmetal/USA has interposed 
legal defenses against the collection on the 
promissory note, and has requested post-
ponement of the motion pursuant to Rule 
56(f) asserting the need for added dis-
covery of information under SVB's control. 
Rule 56(f) requires the court to ensure that 
the parties have a reasonable opportunity 
to make their record complete before ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment 
why he could not make payments. SVB, how-
ever, submitted a telex of October 29, 1984 from 
Rathaus to Mr. Thord Soderlund (SVB's Execu-
tive Vice President), explaining that the inability 
to pay was the result of a delayed shipment 
from China. (Affidavit of Pelle Deinoff, Exhibit 
2). 
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Berne Street Enterprises v. American Ex-
port lsbrandteen Co., 289 F.Supp. 195 
(S.D.N.Y.1968). However, Rule 56(f) is not 
a shield against all summary judgment mo-
tions. Litigants seeking relief under the 
Rule must show that the material sought is 
germane to the defense, and that it is nei-
ther cumulative nor speculative. Quaker 
Chair Corp. v. Litton Business Systems, 
Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527, 533 (S.D.N.Y.1976). 
"A 'bare assertion' that the evidence sup-
porting a plaintiff's allegation is in the 
hands of the defendant is insufficient to 
justify a denial of a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56(f)." Contempo-
rary Mission, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 
648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981). 
Fondmetal/USA's three major opposition 
claims will be considered in light of these 
summary judgment and Rule 56(f) stan-
dards. 
Conversion claim 
Fondmetal/USA claims that SVB is not 
entitled to collect on the promissory note 
because it assisted in, or at least had 
knowledge of, an alleged conversion of cer-
tain of Fondmetal/USA's European ac-
counts receivable by Rathaus' estranged 
partner Lofberg and Fondmetall/AB. Ac-
cording to Rathaus, SVB should bear re-
sponsibility for the conversion because it 
was aware that the conversion was taking 
place and knew that the accounts receiva-
ble were the assets which Fondmetal/USA 
was liquidating to pay the loan install-
ments. Rathaus charges that SVB was 
Lofberg's partner in the negotiation of 
Note A and the related documents, includ-
ing the Settlement Agreement, which pro-
vided in part: 
4. In consideration of the reduction of 
the amount claimed by [Fondmetall/Swe-
den], each Debtor [e.g., Fondmetal/USA 
and Robern] hereby grants to 
[Fondmetall/Sweden] a continuing se-
curity interest in and lien upon all of 
the Debtor's accounts and chattel paper 
now or hereafter existing or acquired 
and all proceeds and products thereof 
(the "Collateral"), as security for the due 
payment of all of the indebtedness of the 
Debtors to [Fondmetall/Sweden], up to a 
maximum amount of $1,400,000. 
(Rathaus Reply Affidavit of 9/23/85 (em-
phasis supplied)). 
According to Fondmetal/USA, this provi-
sion in the original Settlement Agreement, 
subsequently adopted by SVB in the as-
signments and revisions resulting in Note 
C, demonstrates that SVB knew that these 
accounts receivable were security for the 
notes and were the source of payment on 
the Notes. Rathaus also contends that if 
permitted to continue discovery along this 
vein, he may demonstrate that SVB was a 
co-tortfeasor in the diversion of the ac-
counts receivable. 
[4] Even viewed in a light most favor-
able to Fondmetal/USA, the party oppos-
ing the motion, Fondmetal/USA's conver-
sion defense fails to assert a legal bar to 
the entry of summary judgment on the 
note and could only support a request for 
increased discovery on a conversion coun-
terclaim against SVB and Lofberg. 
Fondmetal/USA has not established that 
SVB had any duty to protect these receiva-
bles, that SVB interfered with Fondmetal's 
collection of the receivables, or that it 
would make any difference whatsoever to 
collection on the note if they had been able 
to establish such a breached duty. 
The above quoted passage in the Securi-
ty Agreement explicitly refers to a security 
interest in "all of the Debtor's accounts 
and chattel paper/' and does not earmark 
any specific account, European or other-
wise, as the security for the undertaking. 
Assuming arguendo, that Fondmetal/USA 
had even claimed that there was such a 
specific understanding about the collateral, 
it would not change the fact that this pas-
sage does not create a duty upon SVB or 
any other party to preserve the underlying 
accounts receivable. Because SVB was not 
the beneficiary of this alleged conversion 
of the accounts receivable it works as much 
to SVB's disadvantage as it does to Ra-
thaus' disadvantage, as SVB is the lien 
creditor oeing deprived of its security inter-
est in the accounts. While an alleged con-
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version by either Lofberg or SVB might be 
a defense against SVB's collection on the 
Settlement Agreement, it does not estab-
lish a defense as to collection on Note C, an 
independent promissory obligation. The 
New York Courts have enforced this sepa-
ration between actions against holders of 
promissory notes and actions asserting 
fraud in connection with the security given 
in exchange for these notes. See Reid v. 
Budget Credit, 5 Misc.2d 949, 162 N.Y.S.2d 
750, 752 (Sup.Ct., Kings Cty., 1957) ("The 
wage assignment contract was purportedly 
given as collateral security for the payment 
of an alleged promissory note. The respon-
dent may be found to be a holder in due 
course of such a note. But as regards its 
rights under the assignment of wage con-
tract, the assignee takes subject to any 
defenses or infirmities thereof since it is 
not a negotiable instrument"). Accord, 
Edwards v. Budget Credit, 8 Misc.2d 897, 
167 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup.Ct., Kings Cty., 
1957); Cajuste v. Budget Credit, Inc., 5 
Misc.2d 948, 162 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup.Ct, 
Kings Cty., 1957). 
Furthermore, Fondmetal/USA has not 
produced written evidence other than the 
Settlement Agreement that it was relying 
on the payments of these accounts receiva-
ble to meet its obligations on the Note. 
SVB has produced a telex from Fondme-
tal/USA stating that the basis for its fail-
ure to meet the payment schedule under 
Note B was a delayed shipment of goods 
without reference to the alleged conver-
sion. 
In short, SVB's rights under the promis-
sory Note C are independent of any conver-
sion claim against SVB based on the securi-
ty agreement lien provisions,2 and Fondme-
tal/USA has not cited any authority for the 
proposition that the security agreement 
pertains to any specific accounts receiva-
ble, that anyone had any duty to protect 
2. For the purposes of this motion, 
Fondmetal/USA's assertion is accepted to the 
effect that despite the repeated assignments and 
renewals of the promissory notes, SVB stands in 
the shoes of Lofberg for the purposes of the 
Security Agreement negotiated in conjunction 
with Note A. 
those receivables, or that Fondmetal has a 
basisfor belieyirjgJhat^Vjb jgas awanTof 
thlTallfigfid^conversion. 
Indemnification against claims of SEB 
Fondmetal/USA's second defense 
against summary judgment is that SVB 
breached its duty to indemnify Rathaus 
against claims deriving from a guaranty 
which Rathaus executed on an account 
maintained by Fondmetall/AB at SEB. 
However, neither of the two indemnifica-
tion agreements negotiated in connection 
with the assignment of the note and securi-
ty agreement purports to indemnify Ra-
thaus, but extends by their terms only to 
the liabilities of Fondmetal, Inc. and Ro-
bem International. In addition, they in-
demnify these companies only as to claims 
made against a loan granted by SEB in the 
principal amount of $290,000.00 and not an 
action on the Overdraft Facility account 
which Rathaus personally guaranteed3 and 
upon which he is being sued upon as guar-
antor. 
Rathaus contends that an omission of his 
name from the language of this indemnity 
was a "drafting error" and he has sub-
mitted copies of his attorney's letters to 
SVB requesting the correction of this er-
ror. SVB counters that the personal guar-
anty of Rathaus was specifically excluded 
from the initial release and indemnity 
agreement, indicating that the parties were 
very aware of the two distinct Fondme-
tall/AB accounts at SEB, and that they did 
not intend to bring the Overdraft Checking 
Facility into the scope of the indemnity 
provisions: 
Limited Release and Indemnification 
Agreement 
"1) Except for the full performance o* 
any and all of the terms and condition 
of a certain agreement . . . and for th< 
enforcement of any claims that may b 
3. Fondmetall/AB maintained two accounts J 
SEB, only one of which was guaranteed b; 
Rathaus. 
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made under a personal guaranty from 
Bernt C. Rathaus to SE Banken, Sweden, 
for the debt of Fondmetall/AB, . . ." 
(Rathaus Affidavit 7/7/85, Exhibit B, doc. 
2) (Limited Release and Indemnification 
Agreement). 
[5] However, even if SVB had breached 
such a duty to indemnify Rathaus, it does 
not affect Fondmetal/USA's obligation un-
der Note C. The indemnity agreement it-
self provides that "The agreement by 
[SVB] to hold [Fondmetal/USA and Robern 
International] harmless as set out above 
shall not entitle them to a setoff against or 
in any way limit [Fondmetal, Inc. and Ro-
bern International's] obligations under the 
Promissory Note or the Assignment to 
[SVB] by [Fondmetall/AB] of all its rights 
under said Promissory Note ...," (Rathaus 
Affidavit 7/7/85 Exhibit D, Docs. 1 & 2). 
The claim on this indemnity agreement 
thus cannot block summary judgment on 
Note C against Fondmetal/USA because 
even if established it bears no relationship 
to the obligation under the promissory 
note. 
Holder in due course 
In another attempt to forge a legal link 
between the allegedly unlawful acts of Lof-
berg and his company and SVB, Fondme-
tal/USA charges that SVB does not qualify 
as a holder in due course under section 
3-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
and is thus subject to all of the claims and 
defenses against payment on the note 
available pursuant to section 3-3064 of the 
Code, in this case the conversion and in-
demnification claims discussed above. 
However, a survey of the requirements 
for holder in due course status indicates 
that SVB has met the prerequisites set out 
in 3-302: 
(1) A holder in due course is a holder 
who takes the instrument 
4. Section 3-306 provides in relevant part: 
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due 
course any person takes the instrument sub-
ject to 
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any 
person; and 
(a) for value; and 
(b) in good faith; and 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or 
has been dishonored or of any defense 
against or claim to it on the party of 
any person. 
[6] Fondmetal/USA first claims that 
the Note was not taken "for value" be-
cause Fondmetall/AB assigned the note to 
SVB in satisfaction of an extant debt. 
Whatever the merits of this argument, it is 
one which relates to Note A, and not Note 
C, the one at issue in this motion. Note C 
was negotiated between SVB and Fondme-
tal/USA and was supported by independent 
consideration. It is undisputed that SVB 
liberalized the payment schedule on the 
remainder of the funds due on the note 
when Note C was executed, and declined to 
place Fondmetal/USA in default on the 
payments under Note B (Deinoff Affidavit, 
9/12/85, Exhibit B). 
[7-9] Fondmetal/USA also asserts that 
SVB did not take the note in "good faith" 
because Rathaus had notified SVB that he 
had suspicions that Fondmetall/AB was 
converting the European accounts receiva-
ble of Fondmetal/USA. Good faith under 
Code section 3-302 is governed by its defi-
nition in section 1-201(19) which provides: 
(19) "Good Faith" means honesty in fact 
in the conduct or transaction concerned. 
Under this subjective standard it does not 
matter whether a reasonable person would 
have known that something in the transac-
tion was amiss, but merely that the holder 
did not know that the transaction was sus-
pect. Chemical Bank of Rochester v. Has-
kell, 51 N.Y.2d 85, 432 N.Y.S.2d 478, 411 
N.E.2d 1339 (1980). Fondmetal/USA as-
serts that because Rathaus notified an SVB 
officer that he had suspicions of conversion 
before the execution of the note that this 
was enough to convert acceptance of Note 
(b) all defenses of any party which would be 
available in an action on a simple contract; 
and 
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consid-
eration, non-performance of any condition 
precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a spe-
cial purpose (Section 3-408); and 
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C into an act of bad faith. However, the 
facts surrounding the execution of Note C 
cannot support a charge of bad faith. As 
will be discussed under the question of 
notice infra, notice of defenses against an 
instrument means actual subjective knowl-
edge of defenses, and not the mere exist-
ence of suspicious circumstances. Travel-
ers Indemnity Company i>. American Ex-
press Co., 559 F.Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
[10] When Note B was extinguished 
and Note C was executed, Rathaus did not 
assert this alleged conversion as an excuse 
for non-payment of the note which weakens 
his claim that the notice was sufficient to 
make SVB an actor in bad faith. Further-
more, SVB renegotiated the note at the 
behest of Rathaus and Fondmetal/USA, 
and granted this extension of time to ac-
commodate a payor who had already paid 
$950,000.00 of a $1,400,000.00 loan. 
Fondmetal/USA has cited no authority 
which makes it bad faith to renegotiate a 
promissory note rather than place the pay-
or in default. 
[11] Related to this charge of bad faith 
is Fondmetal/USA's belief that this same 
notice of Lofberg's conversion is notice of a 
defense or claim under 3-302(l)(c). This 
contention ignores the wording of the stat-
ute and its definitional counterpart in sec-
tion 3-304. Section 3-302(lXc) speaks of 
notice of any "defense against or claim to 
it on the part of any person." (emphasis 
supplied), meaning a defense on the instru-
ment in question, and not on the collateral 
Security Agreement. Section 3-304(lXb) 
reinforces the nature of this notice of a 
defense by providing: 
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim 
or defense if .. 
(b) the purchaser has notice that the 
obligation of any party is voidable in 
whole or in part, or that all parties 
have been discharged. 
Official Comment 3 to this section provides 
that the inclusion of the word "voidable" is 
meant to restrict the provision to notice of 
a defense which will permit any party to 
avoid his original obligation on the instru-
ment as distinguished from a setoff or 
counterclaim. Thus Rathaus' notice to 
SVB that Lofberg might have breached the 
provisions of the Security Agreement 
would not be notice of a defense or claim 
pursuant to sections 3-304 and 3-302 of the 
Code. Although Fondmetal/USA can 
maintain a counterclaim based on these 
charges, its existence will not deprive SVB 
of its status as a holder in due course and 
will not prevent the entry of summary 
judgment. See Maglich v. Saxe, Bacon & 
Bolan, RC, 97 A.D.2d 19, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
618 (App.Div. 1st Dept.1983). 
Discovery Sanctions 
[12] Fondmetal/USA has moved pursu-
ant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for an order imposing sanctions 
on SVB for failure to respond expeditiously 
to discovery requests. Sanctions are un-
warranted in this case in view of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the SVB's summa-
ry judgment motion. On June 12, 1985, 
this court provided for discovery to be com-
pleted by November 6, 1985. However, on 
July 15, 1985, SVB filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, staying all discovery pend-
ing the resolution of this motion. In view 
of the fact that Fondmetal/USA has failed 
to show that it lacks any relevant informa-
tion within SVB's control for the purposes 
of its Rule 56(f) claim, sanctions for failure 
to produce such information are not indi-
cated. Of course, Fondmetal/USA will be 
able to undertake continued discovery with 
regard to its counterclaims against SVB 
and third party defendants Lofberg and 
Fondmetall/AB. 
Fondmetal/USA has not disputed that it 
executed an unconditional promissory note 
in favor of SVB and that it has defaulted 
on the payments due under such note. Be-
cause no material dispute of those facts 
exists, and no further discovery under Rule 
56(f) is warranted, SVB is entitled to oar-
tial summary judgment on Note C. 
Submit judgment on notice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
